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CREATING MASCULINE IDENTITIES:
BULLYING AND HARASSMENT "BECAUSE
OF SEX'
ANN C. MCGINLEY*
This Article deals with group harassment of women and men
in the workplace under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, the Supreme
Court held that Title VII forbids harassment by members of
the same sex, but it also emphasized that Title VII is impli-
cated only if the harassment occurs "because of sex."
Oncale's "because of sex" requirement has spawned consid-
erable confusion in same-sex and different sex harassment
cases. This Article focuses on four fact patterns that confuse
courts, scholars, and employment lawyers. In the first sce-
nario, men harass women in traditionally male jobs, but the
harassment is not directed specifically at the women. In the
second, men harass other men who apparently do not con-
form to socially-accepted gender norms of masculinity. In
the third, men harass other men, apparently hazing new-
comers or engaging in "horseplay" with established workers.
In the fourth, men harass women using means that are not
sexual or gendered.
The Article uses masculinities research, combined with new
bullying research to provide the key to understanding the
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gendered nature of these behaviors when the behaviors are
not overtly sexual or gendered. It provides a theoretical
framework for the conclusion that gender is embedded in the
workplace, and that harassing behavior at work is often
rooted in perceptions of gender difference and inferiority of
the feminine and efforts to reinforce the masculinity of the
group and of the job.
INTRODUCTION
"Male bonding is institutionalized learned behavior
whereby men recognize and reinforce one another's bona
fide membership in the male gender class and whereby men
remind one another that they were not born women.''+
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,1 as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court, grants a cause of action to
employees for sexual harassment that creates a hostile work
environment. 2 To maintain a hostile work environment cause
of action, the plaintiff must prove that the harassing behavior
was unwelcome, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms and conditions of the work environment, and because of
sex.3 One question that has vexed courts and commentators is
what the term "because of sex" means. In the sexual harass-
ment context, one possible definition would be that the behav-
ior occurs because of sexual interest of the harasser in the vic-
tim. Indeed, when courts first recognized sexual harassment
as sex discrimination, they conceived of a male supervisor who
harasses a female subordinate in order to fulfill his sexual de-
sires and/or dominate her. Given this desire-dominance para-
digm,4 courts concluded that sexual harassment perpetrated by
a man on a woman occurs because of sex. Presuming the het-
erosexuality of the male harasser, courts reasoned that if it
were not for the victim's sex, the harasser would not have
sexually harassed her.5
+ John Stoltenberg, Toward Gender Justice, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 41,
42 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
2. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav-
ings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
3. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Meritor Savings Bank FSB, 477 U.S. at 66-
67.
4. This term was coined by Vicki Schultz. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualiz-
ing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692 (1998).
5. For a description of this phenomenon, see id.
1152 [Vol. 79
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Another possible interpretation of the term is that the be-
havior occurs because of the biological sex of the victim,
whether or not it is related to sexual interest. In the 1990's, a
number of cases raised the question of whether harassment by
a member of the same biological sex as the victim creates a
cause of action under Title VII.6 In Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services,7 the Supreme Court held that Title VII forbids
harassment by members of the same sex, but it did not limit a
finding of sexual harassment to behavior occurring because of
sexual interest. Rather, severe or pervasive harassment linked
to the sex of the victim created a cause of action under Title
VII.
A third definition of "because of sex" expands the term
"sex" to include "gender." In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a
failure to promote case, the Supreme Court concluded that the
term "because of sex" includes discrimination because of one's
failure to live up to stereotypical norms of one's gender.8 In
other words, Title VII prohibits more than discrimination
based on the biological sex of the victim. It also forbids dis-
crimination because of gender. "Sex" refers to biological sex,
whereas "gender" refers to the social expectations of a person
based on that person's biological sex. Thus, a biological wo-
man's sex is female, and society would expect her gender to be
feminine.9 Some lower federal courts have extended the Price
Waterhouse reasoning to sexual harassment cases. These
courts hold that harassment because of a failure to conform to
gendered expectations, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, vio-
lates Title VII. 10
Despite the Supreme Court's and some lower courts' clari-
fication of the definition of "because of sex," questions remain
about the term's meaning. Oncale emphasized that same-sex
harassment violates Title VII only if the harassment occurs be-
cause of sex. It did not, however, adequately explain what "be-
6. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir.
1994) (concluding that sexual harassment by a male supervisor of a male subordi-
nate does not state a cause of action under Title VII); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119
F. 3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a cause of action exists under Title VII
for same-sex sexual harassment), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998)
(vacating and remanding in light of the Supreme Court decision in Oncale).
7. 523 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1998).
8. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (conclud-
ing that the employer's discrimination against the plaintiff for her failure to con-
form to feminine stereotypes is discrimination "because of sex").
9. Gender does not always conform to biological sex. See infra note 128.
10. See cases discussed infra Part II.C.2.
2008] 1153
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cause of sex" means in this context, and it has spawned consid-
erable confusion in both same sex and different sex harassment
cases. 11 The lower federal courts' confusion is most acute in
cases in which a group of men harasses women or men. This
confusion arises because courts do not appear to understand
the difference between sex and gender. Their view of behavior
occurring because of sex incorporates traditional beliefs about
gender, sex and sexual attraction. The opinions assume that
sexual harassment results from the normal sex drive of an in-
dividual harasser and that "because of sex" necessarily re-
quires the harasser's conscious intent to harass the employee
because of biological sex. While these views may be accurate in
some individual cases, they do not describe all of the potential
motivations of either individual men or of groups of men who
harass.
This Article posits that masculinities theory and new re-
search on the gendered nature of bullying can help courts and
juries to understand that certain group harassing behaviors oc-
cur because of sex. The research demonstrates that many
group behaviors considered normal are very damaging to the
victims and occur with the conscious or unconscious motivation
11. See, e.g., Hilary S. Axam & Deborah Zalesne, Simulated Sodomy and
Other Forms of Heterosexual "Horseplay:" Same Sex Sexual Harassment, Work-
place Gender Hierarchies, and the Myth of the Gender Monolith Before and After
Oncale, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 155, 236-43 (1999) (arguing that courts should
employ a broad definition of "because of sex" and should not read Oncale's dicta to
limit sex to biological definitions, but rather should view sex as the result of the
construction of one's gender identity); Marianne C. DelPo, The Thin Line Between
Love and Hate: Same-Sex Hostile-Environment Sexual Harassment, 40 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1999) (defining "because of sex" as requiring motivation
of the actor and asking whether the victim would have been harassed if he or she
were of the opposite sex); L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment as Discrimina-
tion "Because of... Sex" Have We Come Full Circle?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 439,
458-59 (2001) (arguing that courts interpret Oncale in such a way that they fre-
quently conclude that sexually specific behavior does not occur because of sex);
Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile Environment Claim: Sexual
Harassment Scholarship at the Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185
(2003) (criticizing scholars who have argued that the statute should reach not only
behavior that is motivated by the sex of the individual, but also behavior that has
a disparate effect on women (or men)); Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, "Because of
Sex:" Rethinking the Protections Afforded Under Title VII in the Post-Oncale
World, 69 ALB. L. REV. 139, 173-76 (2005) (noting the wide variety of interpreta-
tions of "because of sex" by courts and arguing that either Congress should re-
spond or the Court should explain "because of sex" further); David S. Schwartz,
When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1793-94 (2002) (arguing that courts should return to a
sex per se rule which would hold an employer liable for sexual harassment if sex-
ual means are used to harass).
1154 [Vol. 79
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of reinforcing gender norms in the workplace or punishing
those who do not conform to those norms. This is the first Arti-
cle aimed at a legal academic audience that analyzes the new
results in bullying research. This new bullying research
strongly suggests that gender is a salient factor in many bully-
ing behaviors. Masculinities theory-when combined with this
new bullying research, feminist theory, and organizational the-
ory-provides the key to understanding the gendered nature of
these behaviors when the behaviors are not overtly sexual or
gendered, or when they appear to encompass hazing or horse-
play. It provides a theoretical framework for the conclusion
that gender is embedded in the workplace. Finally, masculin-
ities theory demonstrates that harassing behavior at work is
often rooted in male workers' perception that the feminine is
inferior and in those workers' efforts to reinforce the masculin-
ity of the group and of the job.
This Article employs four fact patterns to support this the-
sis. In the first, a group of men harasses women in traditionally
male jobs, but the harassment is not directed specifically at the
women. In the second, a group of men harasses other men who
apparently do not conform to socially-accepted gender norms of
masculinity. In the third, men harass other men, hazing new-
comers or engaging in horseplay with established workers. In
the fourth, a group of men harasses women using means that
are not sexual or gendered. 12
Men Harassing Women in Traditionally Male Jobs-Not
Directed Specifically at Women
The first set of cases typically involves male coworkers and
supervisors, in a sex-segregated and predominantly-male work-
ing environment, who harass women using sexual or gendered
behavior, or both; foul, sexually-tinged language; and gendered
derogatory comments about women. 13 When men in these
workplaces are subject to the same environment as the women,
and the harassing behavior is not specifically directed at the
women, some courts have held that the perpetrator is an "equal
12. While female-on-male harassment and female-on-female harassment oc-
cur, this Article does not focus on those fact patterns.
13. See, e.g., Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (concluding that an illegal hostile work envi-
ronment existed where pornographic materials and derogatory remarks were
prevalent in a formerly all-male workplace).
20081 1155
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opportunity harasser."1 4  Using a "but for" analysis, these
courts reason that because both men and women are subject to
the same behavior, the harassment does not occur because of
the woman's sex or gender. They conclude that the harassing
behavior is not directed at women and that the unwanted be-
havior occurred in the all-male workplace even before the
women entered the workforce. Therefore, the biological sex of
the women victims is not a "but for" cause of the harassment. 15
Men Harassing Men Who Do Not Conform to Gender
Norms
In a second typical scenario, men harass other men in the
workplace. This harassment ordinarily involves sexual behav-
ior or language directed at victims who present themselves as
not sufficiently masculine. 16 Courts disagree as to whether
14. See, e.g., Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 356-58 (overturning the lower court's de-
nial of the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict
for the plaintiff in part because comments and gestures that were not specifically
directed at the plaintiff could not have occurred because of her sex), rev'd, 335
F.3d at 331-35 (concluding there was sufficient evidence of differential treatment
for a plaintiffs verdict, but not reaching the question of whether the same behav-
ior may constitute differential treatment of men and women); Petrosino v. Bell
Atl., No. 99-CV-4072(JG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4616, at *19-20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
20, 2003) (granting summary judgment to the defendant because both men and
women were exposed to similar behavior), rev'd 385 F.3d 210, 222-23 (2d Cir.
2004) (concluding that even though both men and women were exposed to the hos-
tile treatment, daily disparagement of women through demeaning depictions and
offensive sexual jokes is an impediment to women at work); cf. Holman v. Indiana,
211 F.3d 399, 402-04 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that because the defendant al-
legedly subjected both men and women to the behavior, he was an "equal oppor-
tunity harasser" and the behavior could not have occurred because of either's sex).
15. Other courts conclude that they should consider the differential effect of
the behavior on the women as well as differential treatment to determine whether
behavior occurred because of sex. See, e.g., Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 222-23 (conclud-
ing that common exposure of men and women to sexually offensive material does
not preclude the woman from relying on the behavior to demonstrate the hostile
work environment occurred because of sex); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,
25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting defendant's argument that the har-
assment did not occur because of sex where both men and women were subject to
abuse); cf. EEOC v. Nat'l Educ. Assoc., 422 F.3d 840, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2005) (con-
cluding in an environment where the boss was male and most of his subordinates
were female that evidence of differences of subjective effects of the behavior on
men and women is "relevant to determining whether or not men and women were
treated differently, even where the conduct is not facially sex- or gender-specific").
16. Courts that find a cause of action under these circumstances rely on Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), to reach this result. See, e.g., Bibby v.
Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that a
plaintiff may prove same-sex sexual harassment by demonstrating that the ha-
rasser acted to punish the victim's non-compliance with gender stereotypes and
1156 [Vol. 79
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this fact pattern creates a cause of action if the victim is homo-
sexual. 17 Even courts that recognize that there is a potential
cause of action for gender harassment often grant summary
judgment to defendants because they conclude, as a matter of
law, that the harassment occurred because of the victim's sex-
ual orientation or perceived sexual orientation rather than his
sex or gender.' 8
Men Harassing Men-Hazing, Horseplay and Incivility
Like the second fact pattern, this scenario involves severe
male on male harassment. While the behavior-taunting,
pinching, grabbing of male genitalia, and other forms of horse-
play-is similar to that in the second fact pattern above, the
victim here does not demonstrate gender non-conforming be-
havior or dress. Rather than punishing the victim's non-
conformity to gender norms, the harassing behavior establishes
the masculine norms for the group and the job. Because fed-
eral courts have stated that horseplay and incivility are not
compensable by Title VII,19 victims rarely bring these cases.
that once the victim proves that the harassment occurred because of sex, sexual
orientation is irrelevant and it is no defense that the harassment may have been
partially motivated by anti-gay animus); see infra Part II.C.2.
17. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062-65
(7th Cir. 2003) (assuming that gay men cannot avail themselves of the sex stereo-
typing doctrine); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F. 3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (five members of the court concluding that the sexual orientation
of the plaintiff is irrelevant to a claim under the sex stereotyping doctrine of Price
Waterhouse).
18. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763-65 (6th Cir.
2006) (affirming a motion for judgment on the pleadings because, according to the
court, the plaintiff alleged only sexual orientation discrimination even though
there was an explicit allegation of gender stereotyping and facts that suggested
that his harassment occurred because he was not sufficiently masculine), cert. de-
nied, 127 S. Ct. 2910 (2007). Courts agree that discrimination because of sexual
orientation is not discrimination because of sex. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that although dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation is reprehensible, it is not prohibited by
Title VII); cases cited infra Part II.C.2.
19. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(assuming that male-on-male horseplay does not create a sufficiently severe or
pervasive hostile work environment); Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc. 417 F.3d 663,
665-66 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment in
a sexual harassment case brought by a male plaintiff who suffered from serious
physical sexual abuse because sexual harassment differs from sex play); In re
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 33, 41 (2005) (Kravit,
Arb.) (stating that the Seventh Circuit distinguishes between sexual horseplay
and sex discrimination in determining whether behavior is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create an actionable hostile work environment).
2008] 1157
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The bullying and masculinities literature, however, demon-
strates that this behavior occurs in many workplaces and that
the behavior, when severe, causes harm to at least some of the
men experiencing it. Furthermore, the literature demonstrates
that the behavior is inextricably linked to the gender of the job
and of those performing it.
Men Harassing Women Using Gender-Neutral Behavior or
Language
This final fact pattern is rarely litigated. Men harass fe-
male coworkers or subordinates using neutral means that are
not sexual or gendered. It is particularly difficult to prove that
the harassing behavior occurs because of sex because the men
may use and abuse legitimate work standards to criticize the
women. For example, in a workplace such as a university that
values intellectual pursuit and scholarly activity, accusations
of poor research are legitimate criticisms if true. If, however, a
false accusation is used to undermine a woman's reputation
and ability to succeed in the institution because of her sex or
gender, it is illegal. Because the behavior is gender-neutral, it
is often difficult to establish in individual cases that the behav-
ior occurred because of sex.
In all four fact scenarios, masculinities theory and the new
research on bullying can help courts and juries determine that
many of these behaviors occur because of sex and, therefore,
violate Title VII if sufficiently severe or pervasive.
This Article builds on work completed almost a decade ago
by legal scholars who proposed new theories to explain a myr-
iad of harassing behaviors and to define which behaviors con-
stitute illegal sex discrimination. Law professors Vicki
Schultz, 20 Katharine Franke,21 and Kathryn Abrams 22 articu-
lated theories concerning the underlying causes and harms of
sexual harassment. 23 They have influenced courts and have
20. See Schultz, supra note 4.
21. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997).
22. See Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998).
23. Another important article written pre-Oncale on the theory of sexual har-
assment is Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 445 (1997).
1158 [Vol. 79
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had an even greater impact on gender and discrimination
scholars. 24
These scholars have demonstrated that the "sexual desire-
dominance paradigm, '25 which courts adopted in defining har-
assment, does not account for the varying patterns of harass-
ment occurring in the workplace. As a result, the Supreme
Court and a few lower federal courts conclude that sexual or
gender harassment may occur even in the absence of evidence
of the perpetrator's sexual desire for the victim. 26
But many recent cases ignore the theories propounded by
Schultz, Franke, and Abrams. Moreover, these theories may
not provide a comprehensive accounting of all sex-based har-
assment. As Professor Abrams recognized, there are so many
different types of harassment and motivations for harassment
that one overarching theory may not be possible. 27
This Article takes these scholars' work as an important
starting point. It uses cases decided after these scholars pub-
lished their articles, as well as masculinities theory and re-
search on bullying and harassment, to interpret, supplement,
and, in some cases, revise the accounts of these legal scholars
in an attempt to explain why these harassing behaviors occur
because of sex.
Although gender is embedded in institutions, this Article
posits that it is still possible to cure the problems caused by its
presence at work. New research by organizational theorists
24. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir.
2002) (Pregerson, J., concurring) (citing Schultz, supra note 4, at 1755 n.387);
Butler v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing
Schultz, supra note 4; Franke, supra note 21, at 764; and Abrams, supra note 22);
see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623,
646 n.87 (2005) (citing Schultz, supra note 4); Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab,
The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 554 n.30 (2001)
(citing Schultz, supra note 4; Franke, supra note 21; Abrams, supra note 22; and
Bernstein, supra note 23).
25. See generally Schultz, supra note 4.
26. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998) (hold-
ing that same-sex harassment is actionable and need not result from sexual de-
sire); Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2007)
(stating that sexual desire need not be present for actionable sexual harassment
under Title VII).
27. Abrams, supra note 22, at 1217. Some of the variables that I observe in-
clude whether the content of the behavior is sexual, gendered, or neutral; whether
the perpetrators and victims are individuals or a group; whether the perpetrators
and victims are women or men; whether motivations for the behavior are con-
scious or unconscious; the relative job status of the perpetrators and the victims in
the workforce; and whether the behavior is directed at particular individuals or
pervasive throughout the workforce.
2008] 1159
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Robin Ely and Debra Meyerson suggests that employers' ac-
tions in training and establishing goals for a group of employ-
ees can dramatically reduce the most damaging masculinities
in an all-male, tough, blue-collar workplace. 28 While these re-
sults have yet to be replicated in other employment settings,
they offer important insights and hope for well-meaning man-
agers that it is possible to construct a gender-neutral work-
place in which employees thrive without sacrificing production
and efficiency.
Part I discusses workers' creation of their masculine gen-
der identities in organizations. It analyzes the extensive re-
search on bullying in schools and workplaces that demon-
strates that much bullying, although gender-neutral in content,
occurs in order to reinforce the masculinity of individuals and
groups of men and of the job itself. Part II explores the legal
landscape of sexual harassment law and analyzes the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence and the theories proposed by scholars to
interpret sexual harassment law. It also evaluates the lower
courts' response to Oncale and to the legal scholars' arguments.
Part III posits that women, and many men, will not enjoy equal
employment opportunity until society recognizes that gender is
embedded in institutions. That is, gender is an invisible part of
organizational structure. Moreover, through individual and
group behaviors, men and women negotiate their roles and
power within institutions. Much of this negotiation consciously
or unconsciously revolves around gender norms and expecta-
tions, practice of masculinities, and bullying. Unbridled com-
petitive masculinities and bullying are harmful to most women
and to all but the most gender-conforming men. Masculinities
and bullying practices define and reinforce certain work as
masculine and feminine. Regardless of individual differences
and skills, they limit masculine work to the most masculine of
men and assign work defined as feminine to women. Finally,
this Article concludes that courts should look to masculinities
theory and the new research on gender and bullying to provide
a theoretical background for understanding that harassing be-
havior occurs because of sex. This understanding provides an
important interpretive tool in determining whether harassing
behavior violates Title VII.
28. Robin J. Ely & Debra E. Meyerson, Unmasking Manly Men: The Organ-
izational Reconstruction of Men's Identity (Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper, 2006)
(on file with the author).
1160 [Vol. 79
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I. MASCULINITIES THEORY, GENDER IDENTITIES, AND THE
LAW AT WORK
This Part provides a theoretical background that Part II
applies to the law of sexual harassment. It analyzes masculin-
ities theory and the social science research on bullying, har-
assment, and hazing. Although social scientists define and
study these phenomena separately, many of the behaviors de-
scribed by these phenomena are the same. Using new research
on gender and bullying, this Part argues that many bullying
behaviors result from gender and have a disparate impact on
gender non-conforming men and women. This Part concludes
by using masculinities theory to examine the relationship
among the diverse social science research on these phenomena,
demonstrating the importance of recognizing that these behav-
iors have gender implications for both men and women.
A. Masculinities and Organizational Theory
Although some believe that gender is the natural result of
biology, masculinities theorists and feminists have made a
strong case that gender is socially constructed. 29 Social scien-
tists agree that gender is not fixed; rather, it is variable and
negotiable. 30 Individuals perform and construct their gender
identities through social context. 31 Society privileges certain
types of gender performances. 32 The hegemonic masculinity is
29. See, e.g., Deborah Kerfoot & David Knights, Managing Masculinity in
Contemporary Organizational Life: A 'Man'agerial Project, 5 ORG. 7, 8 (1998); Ju-
dith Lorber, Beyond the Binaries: Depolarizing the Categories of Sex, Sexuality
and Gender, 66 SOC. INQUIRY 143, 144-145 (1996). For a discussion of feminist
and masculinities literature that posits that gender is socially constructed, see
Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 8 OR. L. REV. 359, 368-70 (2004).
30. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 230-31 (1993) (noting
that gender is a performance and is changeable); JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF
GENDER 244-45 (1994) (describing interactions in which men and women "do gen-
der").
31. See Lorber, supra note 29, at 144 (arguing that society has artificially con-
structed binary concepts of gender (male and female and heterosexual and homo-
sexual) and that adopting these concepts reinforces the society's construct of nor-
mal and deviant groups); see also R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 64 (1995)
(rejecting the concept of biological causes for differences between men and women
and arguing that much of the difference is socially constructed).
32. See CONNELL, supra note 31, at 76-77 (describing the "hegemonic mascu-
linity" as the "masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern
of gender relations"); Lorber, supra note 29, at 143-46 (arguing that gender cate-
gories represent power rather than sex and determine which group will dominate
other groups).
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the culturally dominant masculinity. In many workplaces, it is
aggressive, competitive, hard-driving, entrepreneurial, authori-
tarian, and careerist.33 It is not fixed, but can change depend-
ing on the times or the organizations. 34 It is a complex system
affected by race, class, education, and other variables. 35 Those
who cannot achieve hegemonic masculinity negotiate forms of
masculinity that are subordinated to hegemonic masculinity. 36
In fact, a particular worker may be located in a space in which
his masculinities are both predominant as to some workers and
subordinated as to others.37
Moreover, gender is imbedded in the very structure of or-
ganizations. 38 That is, assumptions about gender inform the
way that work is organized. 39 While individuals bring their
gender identities into the workplace and perform them at work,
gender is a structure that supports the organizational design. 40
For example, the organization is constructed to work most effi-
ciently where men are the primary or sole breadwinners. The
invisible gendered premise accepted by most organizations is
that workers should work to their utmost capacity and, in the
case of white-collar workers, should be available to work at all
hours in order to get the work done. Underlying this concept is
33. See David Collinson & Jeff Hearn, Naming Men as Men: Implications for
Work, Organization and Management, 1 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 2, 13-16 (1994);
Kerfoot & Knights, supra note 29, at 7.
34. See Kerfoot & Knights, supra note 29, at 12 (noting that masculinity is not
fixed but fluid, contingent and shifting).
35. See Joan W. Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning from
Karla Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183, 192, 195 (2002) (noting that masculinities
are "formed by race and class").
36. See David L. Collinson & Jeff Hearn, Men and Masculinities in Work, Or-
ganizations, and Management, in HANDBOOK OF STUDIES ON MEN AND MAS-
CULINITIES 289, 293-98 (Michael S. Kimmel et al. eds., 2005).
37. See Mark Maier & James Messerschmidt, Commonalities, Conflicts and
Contradictions in Organizational Masculinities: Exploring the Gendered Genesis
of the Challenger Disaster, 35 CAN. REV. Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 325 (1998) (ex-
plaining the shuttle Challenger disaster as partly resulting from a combination of
hegemonic and subordinated masculinities).
38. See CONNELL, supra note 31, at 72 (arguing that state organizational
practices are structured in relation to gender and reproduction).
39. See Patricia Yancey Martin, "Said and Done" Versus "Saying and Doing":
Gendering Practices, Practicing Gender at Work, 17 GENDER & SOC'Y 342, 344,
357 (2003) (noting that gender is an institution and that gender practices are as-
pects of the institution).
40. See CONNELL, supra note 31, at 29-30 (concluding that gender is a struc-
ture in organizations); Stephen Whitehead, Disrupted Selves, Resistance and
Identity at Work in the Managerial Arena, 10 GENDER & EDUC. 199, 205 (1998)
(noting that white males are privileged by the gender discourse prevalent in or-
ganizations).
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the implicit assumption that the worker has a male body that
does not bear children and has a partner or wife who deals with
his every outside need-bears his children and cares for them,
buys and prepares his food, buys and washes his clothing,
maintains his home and other possessions, and organizes his
social life.41
Gender is enacted in varying and complex ways through
organizational behavior.42 The organization assigns genders to
certain jobs, and the expectations of persons doing those jobs
are built upon a traditional division of labor in the family.43 In
both blue and white-collar workplaces, the jobs that perform
the primary and most respected work of the institution are
gendered male. The jobs that serve the auxiliary role of help-
ing the men are performed by females. This division of labor
reflects and reinforces the traditional roles of men and women
in the family.44 Thus, jobs of bankers, lawyers, and doctors are
gendered male while jobs as secretaries, paralegals, and nurses
are gendered female.
The normative masculinity in the American workplace in-
cludes aggression, competition, and anxiety. 45 Although nu-
merous masculinities exist in tension with one another, the
powerful hegemonic masculinity is white, middle class, and
heterosexual. 46 Our culture rewards white middle-class men
who compete to prove their masculinity, exclude women from
power because they lack masculinity, and exclude men from
power who do not live up to the normative definition of mascu-
linity.47 Masculinity as anti-femininity "lies at the heart of
contemporary and historical conceptions of manhood, so that
masculinity is defined more by what one is not rather than who
one is."48 Masculinity involves a flight from the feminine, and
41. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 64-68 (2000); Collinson &
Hearn, supra note 36, at 294.
42. See Martin, supra note 39, at 344-45.
43. Id.
44. See WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 71-72.
45. See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and
Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM & MASCULINITIES 182,
183-84 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004).
46. Id. at 184.
47. Id. at 184-85.
48. Id. at 185. As Kenneth Karst states, "[t]he main demands for positive
achievement of masculinity arise outside the home, and those demands reinforce
the boy's need to be what his mother is not. In the hierarchical and rigorously
competitive society of other boys, one categorical imperative outranks all the oth-
ers: don't be a girl." Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegre-
gation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 503 (1991).
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a fear of homosexuality. Men prove their masculinity to other
men in order to gain acceptance. 49 This effort is a "homosocial
event" that requires men to test themselves in order to prove to
other men that they are masculine. 50 This is a dangerous ex-
perience for men, full of risk and relentless competition.
51
The flight from femininity as articulated in Freudian the-
ory holds that a young boy must separate from his mother in
order to develop into a sexual being as a man. 52 The boy repu-
diates his mother and her traits of nurturance, compassion,
and tenderness;53 suppresses these traits in himself; and learns
to devalue women. 54 "Masculine identity is born in the renun-
ciation of the feminine, not in the direct affirmation of the mas-
culine, which leaves masculine gender identity tenuous and
fragile." 55 Because masculine identity depends on its differen-
tiation from the feminine rather than on an affirmation of its
own value, as a concept, it is weak and problematic.
Those practicing masculinities see homosexuality as femi-
nine behavior; homophobia "is a central organizing principle of
our cultural definition of manhood. Homophobia is more than
the irrational fear of gay men, more than the fear that we
might be perceived as gay." 56 It is a fear that other men will
recognize that men are not as masculine as they pretend to
be.57 This fear creates shame and leads to an unwillingness to
stand up for others who are being harassed. 58 Moreover, it
compels men to enact exaggerated masculine behaviors and to
project attitudes that women and gays are "the other" with
whom men compare themselves in order to establish their own
"manhood."59
Historically, immigrants, people of color, women, children,
and homosexuals have played "the other." Black slaves were
seen as dependent, incapable of defending their women and
children. 60 Irish and Italian immigrants were too emotional,
49. Kimmel, supra note 45, at 185.
50. Id. at 186.
51. Id. at 186-87.
52. Id. at 185-87.
53. Id. at 185-86.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 186.
56. Id. at 188.
57. Id. at 189.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 191.
60. Id. at 191-93.
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and Jews were too bookish.61 Asian men-first the Japanese
and then the Vietnamese-were seen as effeminate, soft, small,
and weak.62 Alternatively, many of these groups were per-
ceived as wild beasts, hyper-masculine, and sexually aggres-
sive. 63 Either construction views these "others" in gendered
fashion. 64
While masculinities theory shares many premises with
feminist theory and draws much of its analysis from feminism,
masculinities research attempts to demonstrate why a rever-
ence for the hegemonic forms of masculinity harms men.65 It
acknowledges that men as a group are powerful, but also
claims that individual men often feel powerless. 66 These feel-
ings of powerlessness derive from pressure on men to act as
breadwinners, to compete with other men to demonstrate their
masculinity, and to deny their emotions.67 Two leading Ameri-
can masculinities theorists, Michael Kimmel and Joseph Pleck,
analyze how men react to feelings of powerlessness. 68 Kimmel
argues that men mistakenly conclude that their powerlessness
results from their relationships with women. 69 In fact, men
feel powerless because the "rules of manhood" define only a
small fraction of men as masculine.70 Pleck asserts that men
experience a loss of power because women have expressive and
masculine-validating power over men.71 Women exercise ex-
pressive power over men by helping men to express emotions. 72
They exercise masculine-validating power when they act in a
submissive, feminine way in order to build up the men's mascu-
linity. 73 When women do not exercise expressive power on be-
half of men or refuse to validate the men's masculinity by act-
ing submissive and feminine, men "feel lost and bereft and
61. Id. at 192.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 191-93.
64. Id. at 193.
65. See Peter F. Murphy, Introduction, in FEMINISM & MASCULINITIES 9-10
(Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004); Joseph H. Pleck, Men's Power with Women, Other
Men, and Society: A Men's Movement Analysis, in FEMINISM & MASCULINITIES 57-
60, 67 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004).
66. See Kimmel, supra note 45, at 194-195.
67. See generally id.; Pleck, supra note 65, at 59-60.
68. Id.
69. See Kimmel, supra note 45, at 194-95.
70. See id. at 195.
71. See Pleck, supra note 65, at 59-60.
72. Id. at 59.
73. Id. at 59-60.
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frantically attempt to force women back into their accustomed
role."74
Pleck and Kimmel explain that in response to their feel-
ings of powerlessness, men dominate women in order to prove
to other men that they are strong and powerful. 75 Pleck de-
scribes a scene in a novel in which a young man goes with his
friends to gang rape a woman. When his turn comes up, he is
impotent, and his friends pull down his pants and rape him.76
Explaining this scene, Pleck notes:
[M]en do not just happily bond together to oppress women.
In addition to hierarchy over women, men create hierarchies
and rankings among themselves according to criteria of
'masculinity.' Men at each rank of masculinity compete
with each other, with whatever resources they have, for the
differential payoffs that patriarchy allows men. 77
Pleck also notes that in this society "one of the most criti-
cal rankings among men deriving from patriarchal sexual poli-
tics is the division between gay and straight men."78 He states:
Our society uses the male heterosexual-homosexual di-
chotomy as a central symbol for all the rankings of mascu-
linity, for the division on any grounds between males who
are 'real men' and have power and males who are not. Any
kind of powerlessness or refusal to compete becomes imbued
with the imagery of homosexuality. 79
In a blue-collar environment, competing masculinities are
stark.80 Laborers, who are powerless to adopt the white-collar
hegemonic masculinity, perform their own forms of masculinity
as a means of resisting their more powerful managers who per-
form the hegemonic masculinity. 81 Because the blue-collar
worker's masculinity is subjugated to the hegemonic masculin-
ity of the white-collar worker, blue-collar workers react to and
74. Id. at 60.
75. Kimmel, supra note 45, at 195; Pleck, supra note 65, at 61-64.
76. See Pleck, supra note 65, at 61 (describing a scene from the novel SMALL
CHANGES by MARGE PIERCY).
77. Id. at 61-62.
78. Id. at 62.
79. Id.
80. See David L. Collinson, 'Engineering Humor' Masculinity, Joking and
Conflict in Shop-floor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181, 184-185 (1988); see also infra
discussion accompanying notes 236-60.
81. Id.
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resist hegemonic masculinity. The resistance includes per-
formances of hyper-masculinity and comparisons of their
white-collar superiors to women ("pansies").8 2 These perform-
ances of hyper-masculinity are often directed at women who
work in "men's jobs. '83 They are also directed at men who are
outsiders because they do not conform to the definition of hy-
per-masculinity that is required of the men on the job.8 4
Women and effeminate men may be harassed to under-
mine their competence, to force them out of the job, and to pre-
serve the job as a masculine enclave.8 5 Men also direct this be-
havior at newcomers, and even at those who have been in the
workplace for a period, in order to assure that they conform to
the group's masculine norms and that they perform the behav-
iors that reinforce the norms.86 Because these behaviors as-
sure the job's masculine identity and the masculine identity of
those holding the jobs, the behavior occurs because of sex.
Masculinities theory can help us understand why the har-
assing behavior of groups of men occurs because of sex. This
theory is clarified further by research on bullying behaviors in
schools and work. The next Subpart analyzes the bullying re-
search; the newer research on bullying demonstrates that gen-
der is an important factor in many bullying behaviors.
B. Social Science Research on Bullying, Mobbing, and
Harassment
This Subpart gives a comprehensive view of the bullying
research. It begins with a historical account of the early bully-
ing research, and then discusses newer bullying research by
feminists. Traditional bullying experts clearly distinguish be-
tween what they call sexual harassment and bullying.8 7 This
distinction, however, is not unassailable. Recently, feminist




85. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1762-69.
86. Id.; cf. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, FRATERNITY GANG RAPE: SEX,
BROTHERHOOD, AND PRIVILEGE ON CAMPUS 166-79 (2d ed. 2007) (describing haz-
ing in college fraternities).
87. See, e.g., Stale Einarsen et al., Bullying and Harassment at Work and
Their Relationship to Work Environment Quality: An Exploratory Study, 4 EUR.
WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 381 (2001).
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that leads to the conclusion that bullying has a gender aspect
to it. 88
After describing the historical traditional approaches to
the bullying research, this Subpart analyzes the new feminist
research on bullying, which links bullying to gender. This
Subpart also examines the research on hazing and horseplay
and demonstrates that although the terminology may differ
from the bullying terminology, much hazing and horseplay fits
within the definition of bullying and is significantly related to
gender. After discussing these different research threads, this
Subpart employs masculinities theory to argue that sexual and
gender harassment, bullying and hazing are different terms
that often describe the same behaviors. It explains that al-
though the traditional bullying researchers distinguish sexual
harassment from bullying, Title VII law has a broader inter-
pretation of illegal harassment because it bans non-sexual har-
assing behavior if it occurs because of sex or gender. This back-
ground prepares the reader to consider how Title VII
harassment law should apply to these behaviors, a discussion
which takes place in Part II infra.
1. Historical Background of Bullying Research
Early bullying researchers were mostly German and Scan-
dinavian, and their work was divided into two groups. Devel-
opmental and educational psychologists studied bullying
(which they called mobbing) in schools. Organizational psy-
chologists studied bullying in the workplace. Because these
two groups of scholars had different training and orientation,
they took different approaches. The school specialists focused
more on the individual traits of the bullies and the victims,
whereas the organizational specialists considered the institu-
tional and environmental causes of bullying. Both of these
groups of traditional researchers, however, concluded that bul-
lying was not a gendered phenomenon. This Subpart describes
the research results of the traditional scholars who studied bul-
lying in schools and workplaces and draws comparisons be-
tween the two disciplines. Because of the historical fact that
these researchers did not work together, the school bullying
and work bullying research is described separately here.
Workplace bullying experts can learn a great deal about hu-
88. See infra Part IB.2.a.
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man behavior and the gendered nature of bullying by examin-
ing the bullying behaviors of school children as well as bullying
that takes place at the workplace. This is particularly true
when we consider an ethnographic study of school children that
is described below.
a. Bullying (Mobbing)89 at School
The early bullying research, conducted by developmental
and educational psychologists in schools, examined behavior
such as teasing and badgering directed at a victim who had lit-
tle ability to retaliate or to control the behavior.90 Researchers
focused on the characteristics of the bullies and the victims,91
and concluded that the presence of an aggressive child was a
necessary precondition for bullying in schools to occur. 92 They
defined bullies as boys who oppressed or harassed others regu-
larly, and characterized bullies as personalities with anti-social
conduct disorder. 93 They found that sixty percent of those who
were bullies in sixth through ninth grade had at least one
criminal conviction by age twenty-four, as compared with only
ten percent of those who were not classified as bullies or vic-
tims. 94
This research found that victims were less assertive or ag-
gressive, physically weaker, and often possessed outsider char-
acteristics.95 Victims were more anxious and insecure than
other boys, and they reacted to bullying by withdrawing. 96 The
victims suffered from heightened depression, but the research
did not clarify whether the depression was a cause or a conse-
89. Scholars also refer to "bullying as "mobbing" and/or "harassment." The
term "mobbing" originally referred to behavior by a group, but currently refers to
behaviors by individuals and groups. See Einarsen et al., supra note 87, at 382-
83. Because "bullying" is the term used contemporaneously by scholars to de-
scribe bullying, mobbing, and some forms of harassment, I employ the term "bul-
lying" in this Article.
90. See id. at 383.
91. See id.; Beate Schuster, Rejection, Exclusion, and Harassment at Work
and in Schools, 1 EUR. PSYCHOL. 293, 294, 300-02 (1996).
92. See Schuster, supra note 91, at 300.
93. See Stale Einarsen, Harassment and Bullying at Work: A Review of the
Scandinavian Approach, 5 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 379, 383 (2000).
94. Schuster, supra note 91, at 300.
95. Id. at 301.
96. Id. Gary and Ruth Namie found that victims fall into three categories in
the workplace: nice people, vulnerable people, and superior people. GARY NAMIE
& RUTH NAMIE, BULLETPROOF YOURSELF AT WORK! 54 (1999).
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quence of the bullying. 97 Developmental and educational psy-
chologists concluded that the personalities of the bullies and
the victims account for bullying.98 This theory, however, is con-
troversial, especially to the extent that these studies suggest
that the victim had particular characteristics that may have
caused the bullying.99 More recently, researchers disagree
with the stereotype of schoolyard bullies as clumsy and not so-
phisticated, based on findings that schoolyard bullies are intel-
ligent, socially skilled, and often well-liked. 100 Not all bullies
are psychopaths or sociopaths. 1 1 These are clinical terms that
apply to only 0.5 percent of the population. 10 2 Newer studies
raise doubts about the view that bullies lack self-confidence. 103
While early educational psychologists did not focus on the
gendered aspects of bullying in school, an ethnographic study
conducted in a school in the United States suggests that girls
and boys experience bullying differently. 10 4 The researchers
interviewed three middle school boys and three middle school
girls.10 5 They asked the students about their perceptions of
bullying, the feelings generated by bullying and their recollec-
tion of strategies employed to end bullying. 10 6 The girls were
much more verbal in their descriptions of the bullying and
analysis of potential strategies to combat it. 107 All of the girls
and one of the boys raised gender issues. One girl mentioned
that bullying is unfair, but characteristic of how boys treat
girls.10 8 Another mentioned that the boys called girls names
and revealed the contents of the girls' lockers if the girls re-
fused to help the boys with school work. 109 One girl acknowl-
edged that she knew that a few people in the class were bully-
ing one of the boys."10 She said, "They kind of treat him like
97. Schuster, supra note 91, at 301-02.
98. Id. at 303.
99. See id. at 303.
100. CHARLOTTE RAYNER ET AL., WORKPLACE BULLYING: WHAT WE KNOW,
WHO IS TO BLAME AND WHAT CAN WE Do? 79 (2002).
101. Id. at 106.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 79-80. See also Einarsen et al., supra note 87, at 383-84.
104. See Tiram Gamliel et al., A Qualitative Investigation of Bullying, 24 SCH.
PSYCHOL. IN'L 405 (2003).
105. Id. at 405.
106. Id. at 407-08.
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he's a girl."'11 She blamed the victim because he did not retali-
ate in response to the bullying."12
The boys distinguished horseplay from bullying. While
they reported engaging in horseplay, they did not consider it to
be bullying. 113 They admitted that the behavior was consis-
tently directed at one of the boys and agreed that boys get more
abuse when they do not fight back. 114 A passive and shy boy
was at risk of bullying according to both the girls and the
boys. 115
The girls either were bullied more frequently, or they per-
ceived themselves to be. From the boys' perspective, horseplay
"only crosses the line into victimization when two factors are
present. First, the victim does not wish to engage in horseplay
and, second, the victim does not respond or responds passively
in the face of such rough-and-tumble behaviour."1 16
Other recent research finds a causal link between attrib-
utes and behavior of the victim and repeated bullying. 117 Chil-
dren who are bullied or excluded socially tend to be less asser-
tive and more withdrawn. 118 This submissive response re-
wards the bully's behavior and increases bullying.119
Notably, the studies in schools did not focus on the envi-
ronmental or structural factors that either encouraged bullying
or that permitted it to exist. That focus came in studies of
workplace bullying, which will be examined in the next Sub-
part.
b. Bullying at Work
Scandinavian and German scholars, and more recently
British and American scholars, extended the study of bullying
behavior to the workplace. Bullying, as defined by these schol-
ars, usually includes a repeated set of negative behaviors in the






116. Id. at 418.
117. See generally Claire L. Fox & Michael J. Boulton, Longitudinal Associa-
tions Between Submissive/Nonassertive Social Behavior and Different Types of
Peer Victimization, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 383 (2006).
118. Id. at 396.
l19. Id.
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victim who has difficulty defending him or herself. 120 The be-
haviors include acts that repeatedly and persistently torment a
person. These acts may harm a victim's reputation or ability to
relate to coworkers or to perform the job. 12 1 These acts include
social isolation at work, exclusion, devaluation of the work the
person does, teasing, insulting remarks, ridicule and gossip,
giving the person tasks that are too simple, and exposing the
person to physical violence or threats of violence. 122
Individuals or groups can engage in bullying. Bullying by
groups occurs when the target violates the culture or norms of
the group. 123 Even where there is only one bully, often a group
of employees contributes to the bullying passively by allowing
it to occur. 124 The target of the bullying interprets the group's
behavior as supporting the bullying, even though the reason for
silence may be fear or self-protection. 125
Many scholars who attempt to measure bullying exclude
sexual harassment from the definition of bullying. 126 Their
definition of sexual harassment, however, is both narrower and
broader than that envisioned by American anti-discrimination
law. The European researchers define sexual harassment as
using sexual means to harass a person, and the definition is of-
ten limited to the imposition of unwanted sexual advances on a
victim at work. 127 It does not include harassment that is fo-
cused on the sex or gender of the victim. 128 In contrast, the
Supreme Court has concluded that sexual means are not suffi-
120. Einarsen et al., supra note 87, at 383. Denise Salin, who combines Euro-
pean and U.S. research on bullying, defines bullying as "repeated and persistent
negative acts towards one or more individual(s), which involve a perceived power
imbalance and create a hostile work environment." Denise Salin, Ways of Explain-
ing Workplace Bullying: A Review of Enabling, Motivating and Precipitating
Structures and Processes in the Work Environment, 56 HUMAN REL. 1213, 1214-
15 (2003); see also Pamela Lutgen-Sandvik et al., Burned by Bullying in the
American Workplace: Prevalence, Perception, Degree, and Impact 44 J. MGMT.
STUDIES 837, 838 (2007) (copy on file with the author) (using Einarsen's defini-
tion).
121. See Einarsen et. al., supra note 87, at 383.
122. See Einarsen, supra note 93, at 383.
123. RAYNER ETAL., supra note 100, at 110.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 111-12.
126. See Einarsen et al., supra note 87, at 381-82, 387.
127. See id.
128. Throughout this Article I distinguish sex from gender. "Sex" refers to the
biological sex of a person whereas "gender" refers to the social expectations of a
particular biological sex. Where there is a divergence between the person's sex
and gender, an individual often suffers harassment at work.
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cient proof of sexual harassment; 129 nor does the Court limit
the definition of illegal harassment to unwanted sexual ad-
vances. 130 Rather, a number of courts have held that it is
unlawful to harass a person because of his failure to live up to
the society's stereotypical expectations of his gender. 13 1
Defining bullying to exclude sexual harassment, Scandina-
vian studies conducted in the late Twentieth Century found
that between 3.5 percent and 10 percent of respondents had
experienced bullying at work. 132 In English speaking coun-
tries, studies find a much higher incidence of bullying at
work. 133 A recent study in the United States found that bully-
ing occurred between twenty and fifty percent more often in
American workplaces than in Scandinavian workplaces. 134
Organizational factors contribute to bullying behavior at
work. 135 These factors include workers' inability to monitor
their own work, lack of clear goals, and lack of constructive
leadership. 136 The differences between the school bullying ex-
perts and the workplace bullying experts may be due largely to
their different disciplines which view bullying through differ-
ent lenses. Those who study school children are developmental
and educational psychologists, whereas the workplace experts
129. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
130. See id. at 80 (holding that a hostile work environment need not be moti-
vated by sexual desire); see also Boumehdi v. Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d
781, 788-89 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that a hostile work environment can occur
without sexual behavior); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir.
1988) (concluding that a verbal attack that demonstrates anti-female animus can
contribute to a hostile work environment).
131. See infra Part II.C.2.
132. See Einarsen et al., supra note 87, at 384. Some of these studies employ
slightly different definitions of bullying or different ways of measuring bullying.
For example, some studies give a definition and ask the responders to state
whether they have experienced bullying. Others give a list of behaviors and ask if
responders have experienced one or more of the behaviors at least once a week for
more than a six month period. Other studies ask whether the responders had ex-
perienced those behaviors over a life time. See also Schuster, supra note 91, at
298-99. Schuster notes that Leymann's study found a rate of 3.5 percent, and
that Niedl found a rate of 4.4 percent in Austria in a research institute and 7.8
percent in a hospital. Id. at 295.
133. See Einarsen, supra note 93, at 384-85.
134. See Lutgen-Sandvik et al., supra note 120, at 28.
135. See, e.g., Einarsen, supra note 93, at 387-99; Nathan A. Bowling & Terry
A. Beehr, Workplace Harassment From the Victim's Perspective: A Theoretical
Model and Meta-Analysis, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 998, 1005 (2006) (finding that
work environment affects the likelihood of harassment and that, compared to en-
vironmental factors, victims' individual differences seem to have little effect on
whether harassment will occur).
136. See Einarsen et al., supra note 87, at 390.
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are organizational psychologists. 137 The behaviors described by
both groups, however, are practically identical. 138 Each group
would benefit by learning from the other group. While the
school research emphasized personal characteristics of the
bully and the victim, the organizational psychologists consider
the environment and workplace structures that lead to bully-
ing. It is evident from the research produced by both of these
groups that both personal and structural factors contribute to
bullying behaviors. 139
2. New Theories on Gender and Bullying
While traditional scholars conclude that bullying is not a
gendered behavior, feminists studying bullying conclude that
much bullying behavior is linked to gender. This Subpart de-
scribes this literature. It also examines the phenomena of haz-
ing and horseplay and notes the gendered aspect of much of
these behaviors.
a. Linking Bullying to Gender
Many scholars insist that sex and gender have little to do
with bullying. 140 The Scandinavian studies concluded that
men and women were bullied in equal percentages to their rep-
resentation in the workforce. 14 1  Moreover, these studies
showed that both men and women engage in bullying behav-
ior. 142 Men, however, were primarily bullied by men, while
women were bullied by both men and women. A Swedish study
produced similar results. 143
137. Schuster, supra note 91, at 294.
138. See id. at 302-03.
139. See id. at 303.
140. See Carol Jones, Drawing Boundaries: Exploring the Relationship Between
Sexual Harassment, Gender and Bullying, 29 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 147, 147-
50 (2006) (explaining that bullying researchers draw boundaries between bullying
and sexual harassment and that the boundaries are caused by the narrow concept
that sexual or gendered harassment is sexual in nature); Deborah Lee, Gendered
Workplace Bullying in the Restructured UK Civil Service, 31 PERSONNEL REV.
205, 206-08 (2002) (discussing bullying scholars' view of gender and noting that
some see bullying as unrelated to gender whereas others minimize the importance
of gender and others may categorize sexual harassment as a form of bullying but
seek to differentiate it from bullying).
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There is increasing evidence that gender and bullying are
interrelated. Even Stale Einarsen, the most well-known Scan-
dinavian bullying expert, who defines bullying as not related to
gender, used gendered terms to analyze why certain societies
experience more bullying in the workplace than others. 14 Not-
ing that English speaking countries have a much higher rate of
bullying than Scandinavian countries, he explained that cul-
tures with smaller "power distance" 145 and less hierarchy, such
as Scandinavian countries, experience less bullying. 146  In
countries where there is a greater "power distance" among in-
dividuals, such as the United States, one would expect more
bullying. 147 Scandinavian countries are more "egalitarian" and
feminine, he notes. 148 "Feminine cultures prescribe its [sic]
members not to be aggressive, dominating, and assertive in so-
cial relationships. Further, they value unisexual and fluid sex-
roles, as well as equality between the sexes." 149 This view rein-
forces the position of masculinities theorists that masculine
structures and behaviors are imbedded into the workplace, at
least in English-speaking countries.
In support of this theory, Einarsen discusses sexual har-
assment at work (defined narrowly as "unwanted sexual ad-
vances") and notes that empirical studies support this posi-
tion. 150 He notes that American studies demonstrate that a
much higher percentage of American women than Scandina-
vian women are subject to sexual harassment. Referring to
American and Scandinavian studies of sexual harassment,
Einarsen notes that sixty percent of American women were ex-
posed repeatedly to unwanted sexual attention, compared to
twenty-seven percent of Norwegian women. 151 Of those who
were exposed to unwanted sexual attention, thirty-six percent
of American women believed themselves to be victims of sexual
harassment, but only five percent of Norwegian women
thought the same. 152 "Androgynous sex-roles and feminine
values may prescribe Norwegian men to be less sexually ag-
144. See id. at 384-85.
145. Power distance is "the interpersonal power or influence difference be-
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gressive and dominating than American men, while Norwegian
women may feel free to stop, retaliate, or report a certain be-
havior if experienced as unwanted." 153 Einarsen's need to re-
vert to examples of sexual harassment and to use gendered
terms to describe the incidence of bullying in Scandinavian
countries and the United States demonstrates that bullying is
not wholly unrelated to gender. In fact, his theory is that the
more "feminine" countries have less bullying demonstrates the
inexorable link between gender and bullying. While his re-
search may not support a conclusion that the perpetrators and
victims of bullying differ in incidence by gender, such a show-
ing is not necessary to conclude that bullying is gendered.
In fact, even though finding that women suffer bullying
disproportionately is not necessary to conclude that bullying is
gendered, other studies demonstrate that more women are the
object of bullying. A comprehensive study in Great Britain
found that women in senior management experienced signifi-
cantly more bullying than their male counterparts. 154 While
15.5 percent of female senior managers reported bullying over
a five year period, only 6.4 percent of male senior managers re-
ported bullying over the same period. 155 Although none of the
men who reported having been bullied said that the bullying
occurred on a regular basis, 4.5 percent of the women reported
regular bullying. 156 Men were bullied almost exclusively by
men, whereas women were bullied by men and women. 157 The
153. Id.
154. Helge Hoel et al., The Experience of Bullying in Great Britain: The Impact
of Organizational Status, 10 EUR. J. WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 443, 449 (2001); see
also Ann Cary Juliano, Harassing Women with Power: The Case for Including
Contra-power Harassment Within Title VII, 87 B.U. L. REV. 491, 495-96 (2007)
(arguing that contra-power harassment, by men of women superiors, should be
recognized as illegal harassment under Title VII); Noreen Tehrani, Bullying: A
Source of Chronic Post Traumatic Stress?, 32 BRIT. J. GUIDANCE & COUNSELING
357, 360 (2004) (finding women managers were bullied at a rate of forty-three
percent whereas men were bullied at a rate of thirty percent).
155. Hoel et al., supra note 154, at 449.
156. Id. Denise Salin found, like Hoel, that women in higher positions are vic-
tims of bullying more than their male counterparts. Denise Salin, Prevalence and
Forms of Bullying Among Business Professionals: A Comparison of Two Different
Strategies for Measuring Bullying, 10 EUR. J. WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 425, 435
(2001).
157. Hoel et al., supra note 154, at 450. Hoel and her colleagues found that in
the supervisor and manager levels 62.2 percent of men who were bullied were bul-
lied exclusively by men whereas 30.4 percent of women who were bullied were
bullied exclusively by men and 37.3 percent of women were bullied exclusively by
other women. Only 9.3 percent of men were bullied exclusively by women. Ap-
proximately equal proportions of men and women were bullied by a mixed group
[Vol. 791176
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authors concluded that as women progressed higher in the or-
ganization, they became more vulnerable to negative behaviors
than men. The authors posited that men who feel threatened
by women in traditional male jobs may bully the women in or-
der to exclude them from the positions, and men often used
sexual harassment to accomplish this goal. 158 A Swedish study
found that both men and women suffer threats, violence, and
bullying when occupying temporary or part-time positions, but
women with permanent job contracts endure significantly more
threats and violence than men who have the same job status. 159
Finally, a comprehensive study of incivility in the work-
place in the United States found that incivility is prevalent in
the American workplace, with two-thirds of respondents report-
ing disrespect, condescension, and social exclusion. 160  The
study defined incivility as not having a gendered content; none-
theless, it found that female employees experienced incivility at
a higher rate than male employees did. 16 1 These findings sug-
gested that female and male employees were targeted at differ-
ent rates of incivility based on their sex, and that incivility
could potentially create a disparate effect on the work envi-
ronment of females. 162
In a study of incivility occurring in the federal courts, the
authors noted that commentators have depicted attorneys as
gladiators, barbarians, and professional combatants. 163 These
characterizations are masculine, and the study found that
many attorneys engage in uncivil strategic behavior. 16 4 Many
more women than men reported that they suffered gender inci-
vility in the federal courts. 16 5 Moreover, when both men and
women experience mistreatment, women experience gendered
of men and women. Id. Men workers and supervisors, but not senior managers,
report higher frequency of exposure to negative behaviors than their female coun-
terparts. The authors attributed this result to horizontal and vertical segregation
in the job market. This suggests, according to the authors, that male work envi-
ronments are more hostile than those that are predominantly female. Id. at 461.
158. Hoel et al., supra note 154, at 461. This study evidently included sexual
harassment in the study of bullying.
159. Marjan Vaez et al., Abusive Events at Work Among Young Working
Adults, 59 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES/INDUS. REL. 569, 573, 576-79 (2004).
160. Lilia M. Cortina et al., Incivility in the Workplace: Incidence and Impact, 6
J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 64, 75 (2001).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Lilia M. Cortina et al., What's Gender Got to Do with It? Incivility in the
Federal Courts, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 236 (2002).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 246.
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treatment, and men experience non-gendered, general mis-
treatment.166 Women reported that they were ignored or ex-
cluded from conversations among attorneys and between
judges and male attorneys. 167 They also claimed that they
were discredited professionally, silenced, and experienced gen-
der disparagement-jokes and comments that were sexist,
stereotyped women, or trivialized sex discrimination and other
legal issues. 168 Some of the subjects explained that although
much of the behavior is not explicitly anti-female, they believe
it occurs because of gender.1 69
In a study on the gendered nature of bullying in higher
education, researchers evaluated the importance of gender in
the perception and experience of bullying and found that, while
researchers and their subjects perceive that gendered power is
related to sexual harassment, bullying, in contrast, is seen as
falling within organizational power. 170 Some harassment, how-
ever, may involve bullying behavior. Researchers found that
managers more often perpetrated bullying than colleagues, but
one-fifth of the cases reported bullying by colleagues on the
same level as the victims. 171 Women, they found, were more
likely to be targets of bullying.172
The higher education study concluded that the bully often
has more organizational power than the victim, and he or she
uses that power to bully the victim. 173 The bully with more
power can subvert the mentoring systems established to pro-
tect and support the staff, abusing those systems to bully or in-
timidate the victim. 174 He can also use the concept of strong
managerial control to mask bullying. 175
Furthermore, women and men perceived the behavior dif-
ferently. Some men, but no women, denied the existence of
bullying altogether. 176 Men saw some of the behavior as
166. See id. at 246-47.
167. Id. at 247.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 253. Ironically, other women insisted that the behavior does not
occur because of gender.
170. Ruth Simpson & Claire Cohen, Dangerous Work: The Gendered Nature of
Bullying in the Context of Higher Education, 11 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 163, 165
(2004).
171. Id. at 170.
172. Id. at 179.
173. Id. at 170, 175-76.
174. Id. at 176.
175. Id. at 177-78.
176. Id. at 171.
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"strong management," a technique within the organizational
structures. 177 Women, in contrast, saw the behavior as per-
sonal and reported experiencing emotional distress. 178 This
study, when compared to the interviews of school children de-
scribed in Part I.B.l.a above, signals the importance that
women and girls assign to behaviors they label as bullying.
Men and boys, on the other hand, downplay the behavior as
"horseplay" or "management techniques."' 79
Because men view bullying as an organizational technique,
they are less likely to see bullying as a cause for concern and
may be more reluctant to intervene on behalf of victims. 180
Women are more likely to seek social support, or to report to
their manager, than to go to personnel. 81 They use a more
"avoidance/denial" coping strategy, which may be counterpro-
ductive because it encourages the bully to escalate the bullying
over time. 182
Studies of coping strategies of men and women in work-
places where bullying occurs have found that men are more ag-
gressive and confrontational when bullied than women, who
are more submissive; women seek more social support in re-
sponse to bullying.'8 3 For women, increased bullying is associ-
ated with increased avoidance.18 4 These differences between
men and women's coping strategies mirror those of boys and
girls who are bullied at school. 185
These studies demonstrate that gender is very much a part
of bullying, but not in the sense of what bodies-men's or
women's-occupy managerial positions. Rather, the organiza-
tional power relations are heavily gendered. The "managerial
prerogative" over decision making is a masculine discourse that
is based on power and control.18 6 Gendered assumptions were
present in the performance reviews in higher education in
Britain because they are linked to "masculinist concerns with
177. Id. at 171-72.
178. Id. at 172.
179. Id. at 171-72.
180. Id. at 179-80.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 181.
183. See Ragner F. Olafsson & Hanna L. J6hannsd6ttir, Coping with Bullying
in the Workplace: The Effect of Gender, Age and Type of Bullying, 32 BRIT. J.
GUIDANCE & COUNSELING 319, 329 (2004).
184. See id.
185. Id. at 330.
186. Simpson & Cohen, supra note 170, at 182.
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personal power and the ability to control."187 Both men and
women can "invest their sense of being in masculinist dis-
courses."188 Some women, rather than challenging the mascu-
linist discourse, conform to it and employ bullying tactics
themselves. 189 "[W]hile, irrespective of gender, much bullying
involves the abuse of power, such behaviour cannot be divorced
from gender considerations." 190 The authors of the higher edu-
cation study concluded:
[Wie find gender differences in the scale and perception of
bullying as well as in the target responses. We consider the
implications of these differences for bystander intervention,
for the scale of bullying and for the ability of targets to stop
the behaviour. Drawing on bullying literature, we point to
the critical role of organizational structures in understand-
ing bullying behaviour. In particular, we refer to the capac-
ity of bullies to capture and subvert structures and proce-
dures to their own ends. While some aspects of bullying
may cut across gender, we locate these common factors
within the masculinist discourses of management. This
throws light on the possible interconnections between sex-
ual harassment and bullying behaviour. While sexual har-
assment is 'overtly' gendered, bullying also needs to be seen
as a gendered activity-although at a different, and perhaps
more deep-seated, level. Bullying therefore needs to be put
in a gendered context in order to further our understanding
of this behaviour. 19 1
This conclusion makes the important link between sexual
harassment and bullying behaviors. It acknowledges that sex-
ual harassment is an "overtly" gendered behavior whereas bul-
lying may be gendered covertly. But Title VII law does not re-
quire that sexual harassment be "overtly" gendered. In fact,
the only limitation under Title VII is that the behavior occurs
or affects women disproportionately because of sex. 192 Title VII
applies both to behavior that is gendered and sexual and to be-
havior that is gender neutral so long as it is because of sex.
The fact that the bullying is gendered should at least permit





191. Id. at 183.
192. Here, the term "sex" includes gender.
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Deborah Lee, a British psychologist who has done signifi-
cant work on gender and bullying, agrees that workplace bully-
ing is gendered. 193 She notes that organizational structures
are designed to reproduce male power through recruitment and
selection methods, job grading and career ladders, and work
hours. 194 Her interviews demonstrate that at least in the UK,
the restructuring of the civil service system and the establish-
ing of performance pay offered the organization a means of bul-
lying that is based on gender. 195
She describes two scenarios that she believes occurred as a
result of gender. One interviewee, a woman, was passed over
for the promotion that was rightfully hers based on her experi-
ence and tenure in the job because her boss believed that she
did not conform to the appropriate conduct for a woman in the
workplace. 196 Another, a man, was treated poorly because the
manager judged him as not having sufficient control over his
family life. 197 Both, Lee concluded, were subject to gendered
expectations. 198 The woman seeking the promotion was insuf-
ficiently feminine and too aggressive for a woman, whereas the
man did not conform to the notions of man as breadwinner that
the boss expected. 199
Lee explains that men are judged badly if they are unable
to keep their home and work lives separate. 200 A "man's man"
is a family man in the sense that he takes seriously his status
as breadwinner, and will be rewarded for his breadwinner
status. 20 1 He is not a "man's man" if he perceives his family re-
sponsibilities as including time off work to pick up his wife af-
ter her operation in the hospital. 202 Lee concludes that the ab-
sence of gender analysis in current workplace bullying
discourse is problematic. 203 Although both men and woman
193. See Lee, supra note 140, at 206.
194. See id. at 207-08 (citing SUSAN HALFORD & PAULINE LEONARD, GENDER,
POWER AND ORGANISATIONS 50-56 (2001)).
195. See id. at 212. She notes that women in organizations who are tolerated
tend to play quasi-familial, limited roles. For example, the "aunt" is the older
woman with senior status but no power. Id. at 215. The "daughter" is a younger
woman who is allowed a few privileges but who has no real power. Id. (citing
HALFORD & LEONARD, supra note 194, at 83).
196. See id. at 213-15.
197. Id. at 222.
198. Id. at 214-20.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 221, 225.
201. Id. at 222-23.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 225.
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can bully and both can experience bullying, these facts do not
prevent the behavior from being gendered.20 4
Carol Jones, a British feminist psychologist, also criticizes
the mainstream bullying literature for tending to view bullying
as gender neutral 20 5 and demonstrates the link between bully-
ing and same-sex harassment of men. She explains that bully-
ing experts often consider "bullying" and "harassment" to be
general categories that subsume other forms of harassment
such as sexual, gender, or racial harassment. 20 6 This approach
obscures the gendered nature of organizations and bullying.
The mainstream bullying scholars ignore gender; as evidence
that bullying is gender-neutral, scholars note that both men
and women are targets of bullying, and both men and women
act as bullies.20 7 Many of the bullying theorists attribute bully-
ing, therefore, to organizational power alone. 208
In response, Jones notes that many of the newer surveys
demonstrate that women are more often the targets of bullying
than their male counterparts. 20 9 Moreover, she reiterates that
the research shows that as women move up the management
ladder, they become subject to increased bullying; this research
demonstrates that it is not merely organizational power that is
responsible for bullying.210
The predominance of men as bullies would not surprise
masculinities theorists. Men use sexual, gendered, and neutral
means of harassment in order to demonstrate their own mascu-
linity. The next Section on hazing and horseplay suggests that
these behaviors occur in order to assure the male gender iden-
tity of the exclusively male group, and to create unity and to
assure that women and outsider men do not join the club. This
behavior, perhaps more than any other, in sex-segregated
workforces maintains the status quo of segregation between
men's jobs and women's jobs.
204. Id.
205. See Carol Jones, Drawing Boundaries: Exploring the Relationship Between
Sexual Harassment, Gender and Bullying, 29 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 147, 148
(2006).
206. Id. at 147.
207. Id. at 152 (reviewing the reasons why mainstream scholars claim that
bullying is not gendered).
208. See id. at 151-52.
209. See id. at 151.
210. See id. at 152.
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b. Hazing and Horseplay
Stale Einarsen and Bjorn Inge Raknes studied general
harassment of men in a blue-collar sex-segregated workplace.
The workplace was approximately ninety-five percent male.
They defined harassment as distinct from sexual harass-
ment.211 They found a fairly high rate of harassment of men in
a predominantly male workplace. 212 At least 88.5 percent of
the men who answered the questionnaire had experienced one
of the negative behaviors 213 during the previous six months
214
and most of the harassing behavior was propounded by co-
workers.215
Younger men experienced more harassing behaviors than
older men.216 The researchers believe this may be because
young workers were exposed to widespread horseplay and jok-
ing as well as hazing rituals for newcomers. 217 These behav-
iors "probably function" as an expression and test of male iden-
tity.218 This research is important to the question of whether
the behavior occurs "because of sex" because even though the
researchers distinguish general harassment from sexual har-
assment, their conclusion that the behavior is a "test of male
identity" relates to the gender of the victim. The male victims
of the behavior, however, insisted that they had not been
"sexually harassed." The victims and the researchers clearly
defined sexual harassment much more narrowly than the be-
havior made unlawful by Title VII. Title VII forbids both sex-
ual harassment and gender harassment. Harassment that
211. Sexual harassment was defined as "[u]nwanted sexual advances,"
"[u]nwanted sexual attention," "[offending telephone calls or written messages,"
and "[d]evaluing of your 'rights' and opinions with reference to your gender."
Stile Einarsen & Bjorn Inge Raknes, Harassment in the Workplace and the Vic-
timization of Men, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 247, 252, 254 (1997).
212. Id. at 251.
213. To test whether a person had suffered bullying the authors administered
the "Negative Acts Questionnaire" which consisted of a long list of acts or behav-
ior that the employee may have experienced. Examples of these acts include the
spreading of gossip or rumors, repeated offensive remarks, ridicule, and the with-
holding of information that is necessary to the person's job. Id. at 250, 253.
214. Id.
215. Harassment, as defined by the researchers, took five possible forms: (1)
manipulation of the victim's reputation, (2) manipulation of victim's ability to per-
form work tasks, (3) manipulation of victim's ability to communicate with cowork-
ers, (4) manipulation of social circumstances, and (5) violence or threats of vio-
lence. Id. at 249.
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tests a person's "male identity" must occur because of gender
under Title VII.
A predominant form of male identity harassment is hazing.
Hazing is "an activity that a high-status member orders other
members to engage in or suggests that they engage in that in
some way humbles a newcomer who lacks the power to resist,
because he or she wants to gain admission into a group. '219
Hazing rituals are prevalent in military academies and college
fraternity and sorority inductions, even though many colleges
and universities prohibit specific hazing behaviors.220 Hazing
rituals are ordinarily secret and may involve excessive drink-
ing, forcing a pledge to eat feces or to wear diapers, the place-
ment of the hazed in dark closed coffins, nudity, and phallic
references. 221 Far from a harmless induction ceremony, hazing
has resulted in serious injury and death. 222
College campuses are infamous homes to hazing rituals.
Peggy Reeves Sanday, an anthropologist, studies the culture of
some223 fraternities and the universities' support of such cul-
ture. 224 She analyzed the fraternity rape culture on college
campuses in Fraternity Gang Rape.225 A gang rape in 1983 at a
University of Pennsylvania fraternity prompted her original
study.226 She found that men who join fraternities are sub-
jected to severe hazing rituals in order to bond with the frater-
nity "brothers." These rituals unite the group and substitute
family connections, love, and individual values for the values of
the group. Once the inductee passes a secret test of masculin-
ity, he then "becomes a man." Women are relegated to sex ob-
jects. During the hazing rituals, the pledges are accused of be-
219. HANK NUWER, WRONGS OF PASSAGE: FRATERNITIES, SORORITIES, HAZING,
AND BINGE DRINKING xxv (1999).
220. See id. at 31-37, 92-115.
221. See id. at 131-32; SANDAY, supra note 86 at 166-79.
222. See NUWER, supra note 219, at 237-80 (listing "a chronology of deaths"
occurring mostly by hazing).
223. Sanday makes it clear that the particular fraternity involved in the rape
and the University of Pennsylvania are not the only institutions where this be-
havior occurs. In fact, she demonstrates that the behavior is normalized. By the
same token, she is careful to state that not all fraternities or members of fraterni-
ties comport themselves in the ways discussed in her book or in this Article.
224. See SANDAY, supra note 86.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 36-38. Because the victim was in an alcoholic state and, according
to Sanday, unable to give consent to sexual relations with a group of fraternity
brothers, Sanday refers to the "alleged rape" as a "rape." Id. I will follow suit in
this Article.
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ing "wimps" and "pansies" and are forced to prove that they are
"real men."227 She explains:
These rituals stamp the pledge with two collective images:
one image is of the cleansed and purified "manly" self
bonded to the brotherhood; the second image is of the de-
spised and dirty feminine, "nerdy," and "faggot" self bonded
to the mother. Thus the process of becoming a man and a
brother relies on negation and humiliation as a ritual device
in order to break social and psychological bonds to the fam-
ily in establishing new bonds to the brotherhood. The
traumatic means employed to achieve these goals induces a
state of consciousness that makes the abuse of women a
repetition of cleansing the self of the inner, despised female
as brothers renew their fraternal bonds.228
Once fraternity "brothers" enter into a homo-social rela-
tionship with one another, they build their unity and masculine
status by denigrating women and girls. They attend porno-
graphic films together, engage in group rituals and treat
women as sexual objects. 229 Although the members speak
about "pulling train" and "corpse riff" which refers to gang rap-
ing a woman who is comatose due to drugs or alcohol, 230 the
brothers deflect the blame to the woman who, the brothers con-
clude, deserved the treatment she received. 231 Their common
discourse reflects the "explosive nature" of male sexuality and
the concept that "boys will be boys. ' 232 Women are expected to
control their own sexual behavior and are also responsible for
controlling the men's behavior. 233 The men, in contrast, by ex-
ercising their dominance over the women sexually, gain pres-
tige and enhanced masculinity.234 The hazing rituals, as well
as group behavior once the pledges become brothers, break the
young man's bonds with his family so that he can exorcise all of
his despised feminine aspects, bond with his fraternity broth-
ers, and become a real man. 235
227. Id. at 165.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 140.
230. Id. at 89.
231. See id. at 106.
232. Id. at 83.
233. See id. at 106.
234. See id. at 83.
235. See id. at 165, 166-77.
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Although not as secret and ritualistic, men also engage in
hazing of newcomers in the workplace in order to assure group
unity. Social scientists have studied the performance of mascu-
linities in workplace environments that are all male or pre-
dominantly male. Even in the absence of women workers, the
men enact masculinities in relationship to one another. That is,
they engage in competitive ritual behaviors such as sexual hu-
mor, aggressive derogatory comments, and physical touching
and grabbing of other men's genitals. The men compete ag-
gressively by engaging in these behaviors in order to prove
their masculinity to one another.
In many blue-collar workplaces, the competition takes the
form of aggressive humor and derogatory comments. For ex-
ample, men use humor to build a sense of solidarity, to break
the monotony of their jobs, and to resist the tight control exer-
cised over them by the managers. 236 In a study of the relation-
ship between humor and masculinity in blue-collar shops in
England, 237 the men working on the shop floor developed a
"shared sense of masculinity" by adopting exaggerated nick-
names for each other and by using hyper-masculine banter on
the shop floor, "permeated by uninhibited swearing, mutual
ridicule, [and] displays of sexuality and 'pranks.' ' 238 By con-
trasting their own hyper-masculinity with what they character-
ized as effeminate behavior of management, the men actively
resisted their subordination by management. 239 Note that
their resistance was couched in explicit gender terms. They
characterized management as effeminate: "twats" and "nancy
boys."240 This humor gave them a sense of power and authority
at work, permitting them to "negate and distance"241 their
managers, even though their shop jobs required monotonous,
repetitious tasks.
Their use of humor also allowed the men to exercise pres-
sure on the group to conform to working-class masculinity. The
shop followed the concept of "survival of the fittest. '242 For ex-
ample, men were expected to take a joke and to laugh at them-
selves and spar with others, act aggressively and critically,
236. See David L. Collinson, 'Engineering Humor: Masculinity, Joking and
Conflict in Shop-floor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181, 184-185 (1988).
237. See id.




242. See id. at 187.
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treat others disrespectfully, and create embarrassment in oth-
ers.243 Newcomers were especially vulnerable to the mistreat-
ment. They "had to negotiate a series of degrading and humili-
ating initiation ceremonies," designed to teach them how to
take a joke and be a man.244 The ability to survive these cere-
monies signaled to the group that the initiate was willing to fol-
low the precepts of the male group. The ridicule included dis-
plays of "tough masculinity" and the testing of it in others. The
jokes centered on a "preoccupation with male sexuality and the
differentiation of working class men from women."245 Through
this performance, the workers constructed their identities as
independent, powerful, and sexual, and dismissed women as
passive and dependent. 246
Men who others perceived as outsiders were kept at a dis-
tance or had to put up with the joking in any event. For exam-
ple, the author of the study, David Collinson, clearly an out-
sider to the blue-collar workplace because of his education,
observed that he endured joking. The humor directed at him
emphasized his university degree and included derogatory
comments comparing him to a woman-a "lazy cunt." Finally,
only after he proved his endurance and that he would not chal-
lenge the power dynamics at the workplace, the men gave him
a card accepting him into the "dumb fuckers club. '247
The men emphasized two competing masculine identities
on the shop floor: that of sexual conqueror and that of bread-
winner. For the younger men, there was a display of sexuality
through active construction of women as sexual objects. De-
rogatory comments about women as sexual objects and boasts
of sexual conquests, combined with nude photographs of
women displayed openly on walls of the shop floor, created an
atmosphere of explicit compulsory male heterosexuality. For
the older men, their role as breadwinners was a crucial part of
male self-respect. 248 Men emphasized that it was their pre-
rogative not to let their wives know how much money they
earned,249 and they judged themselves and others by their abil-
ity to purchase a home. 250 All engaged in peacocking behav-
243. See id.
244. Id. at 188.
245. Id. at 190.
246. See id. at 191.
247. Id. at 190.
248. See id. at 191.
249. See id. at 192.
250. See id. at 197.
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ior-strutting their masculine prowess-by using foul language
and rough discussion of women. Collinson observes, however,
that many of the men admitted to him that they did not act
this way at home.251 Indeed, their behavior was a performance
that established their identities as masculine men, a perform-
ance that was necessary to survive the work environment. The
gendered behavior did not exist outside of the workplace;
rather, the men's gender identities were socially enacted at
work through their performances and their interactions with
one another. 252
Tension on the shop floor illustrated a conflict between
these two competing masculinities. There was tension between
the men's informal culture and the collective bonus system.253
Both reflected contradictory definitions of masculinity. The in-
formal culture, which emphasized the working class masculin-
ity of the workers and their sexual prowess, discouraged in-
creased productivity and encouraged solidarity in resisting
managerial control. 254 The collective bonus system, however,
encouraged increased productivity, which, in turn, enhanced
the masculinity of members of the. group by helping men earn
more and achieve the status of good providers.255 Within this
contradictory framework, the men used humor to control and
discipline workers who were perceived as lazy. Humor related
to a fellow worker's laziness often touched a nerve in the victim
and led to battles and unwillingness to talk to coworkers. 256
Ironically, "[a]s a result of these shop-floor battles for dignity,
which emerge in jokes but collapse into mutual disdain, hierar-
chical control becomes unnecessary."257
251. See id. at 192.
252. For a description of how outsider employees perform their identities in the
workplace and for an argument that making adverse employment actions based
on an employee's failure to perform an "insider" identity should violate Title VII,
see generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1259 (2000). Professors Carbado and Gulati explain that the performance of
identities helps outsiders become more acceptable in the workplace but may lead
to a denial of oneself. See id. at 1288. While masculinities behaviors in the shop
context are performed to allow the worker to fit in with coworkers rather than as
a signal to superiors or supervisors (and are often in reaction to supervisors),
these behaviors also appear to be performance of identities in order to gain accep-
tance.




257. Id. at 197.
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The men used humor to mask serious criticism and fragile
relationships. The relationships between the men were mostly
defensive and superficial. A number of the workers admitted
that the joking sometimes went too far and that they engaged
in the practice as a performance in order to comply with the
culture's demands. 258 Collinson noted:
The whole masculine style of shop-floor joking was aimed at
testing and displaying the individual's inner strength to
withstand teasing and ridicule. Yet, paradoxically, many of
the men who subscribed to the culture and articulated its
demands could not, in fact, handle them. The pressing and
pervasive desire to secure male dignity in the eyes of others
was repeatedly found to be incompatible with a concern to
display impregnability and a disregard for the crit/witicisms
of others. The sensitivity of working-class male identity
meant that joking was often misinterpreted, when used as a
pretense of hostility, and construed correctly when em-
ployed to 'make a point.'259
Often a worker would "snap" as a result of the joking
aimed at him, which at times would have a malicious intent.
In one case, the victim of the jokes suffered a "total emotional
breakdown."260
These studies demonstrate that men in all-male environ-
ments often engage in hazing and horseplay behaviors that
serve many purposes. First, the hazing assures that new
members live up to the masculine ideals that identify the envi-
ronment; second, it establishes the masculine norms of behav-
ior; third, it provides proof of the masculinity of individual
members for their friends and colleagues; and fourth, as in the
shop floor example, hazing and horseplay are used as a form of
resistance or fighting back against a more oppressive form of
masculinity.
3. Harms Caused by Bullying
Collinson noted the damage caused by masculine behaviors
on the shop floor. The rough behavior caused hurt feelings, an-
ger, damaged relationships, and a total nervous breakdown in
258. Id. at 193.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 194.
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one case.261 Men who "did not act that way at home" felt forced
to perform their masculine identities in hyper-masculine ways
at work in order to fit in.262
Other researchers have also found that bullying, hazing
and harassment in the workplace cause serious harm to the
victims. Pervasive negative behaviors correlate with low job
satisfaction 263 and damaged psychological health,264 and affect
not only the victims' work relationships but also their family
relationships. 265 Studies have reported that bullying victims
are depressed, 266 and one study reported that forty-four percent
of victims experienced symptoms at the level of Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder.267
This research demonstrates that hazing behaviors cause
many serious harms. With an understanding of masculinities
261. See id.
262. Id. at 192-93. Although these men are not outsiders (in the sense that
they do not belong to outsider race, gender, or national origin groups) in Col-
linson's shop, their behavior resembles the performance of identities that outsid-
ers negotiate in workplaces in order to gain acceptance. See Carbado & Gulati,
supra note 252, at 1288. Collinson explained the burden on some of these "insid-
ers" in order to conform to the workplace norms. As Carbado and Gulati note,
there is a cost to outsiders of performing identities that are at odds with their so-
cial and political images. See id. at 1290. Unless Collinson's workers performed
masculinities, they feared (and were probably correct) harassment from others in
the group. Id. at 187-89. Instead of standing up to the group, they participated
in behaviors that were often harmful to themselves. Id. at 193-94. This behavior
is similar to the "comforting" that Carbado and Gulati describe as performing
"comforting acts to make insiders comfortable with their outsider status," but that
take their toll on the performer. Id. at 1301 (citing Clark Freshman, Whatever
Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify Discrimination
and Promote Coalitions between "Different" Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313,
400 (2000)).
263. Nathan A. Bowling & Terry A. Beehr, Workplace Harassment from the
Victim's Perspective, A Theoretical Model and Meta-Analysis, 91 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 998, 1008 (2006); see also Cortina et al., supra note 160, at 75 (demon-
strating the relationship between low job satisfaction and victimization); Maarit
Vartia & Jari Hyyti, Gender Differences in Workplace Bullying Among Prison Of-
ficers, 11 EUR. J. OF WORK & ORG. PSYCHOL. 113, 124 (2002) (same).
264. Einarsen & Raknes, supra note 211, at 256.
265. See Sian E. Lewis & Jim Orford, Women's Experiences of Workplace Bully-
ing: Changes in Social Relationships, 15 J. CMTY. & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 29,
42 (2005).
266. See Vaez et al., supra note 159, at 576-79.
267. Tehrani, supra note 154, at 363; see also Helge Hoel et al., Bullying is Det-
rimental to Health, but all Bullying Behaviors are not Equally Damaging, 32
BRIT. J. GUIDANCE & COUNSELING 368 (2004) (finding harm similar to PTSD);
David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of 'Workplace Bullying" and the Need for
Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 483 (2000)
(cataloguing the illnesses caused by bullying at work).
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theory, these harms should be compensable under Title VII be-
cause the behaviors occur because of sex.
C. Reconciling Sexual and Gender Harassment, Bullying,
and Hazing
1. Using Masculinities to Identify Similarities
Although scholars who study bullying, harassment, and
hazing come from diverse fields, the behaviors described are
virtually the same for purposes of legal analysis. The bullying
and mobbing research originated in studies of children in
schools and moved to persons in the workplace. Researchers
from fields as diverse as educational psychology and manage-
ment approach the research from different perspectives. Some
focus on the characteristics of the bullies and the victims while
others focus on the importance of the organization in generat-
ing and preventing bullying behaviors. The behaviors demon-
strate a remarkable similarity across the board, whether the
perpetrators and/or victims be children or adults, and whether
the behavior occurs in schoolyards, in fraternities, in shops, or
in the upper echelons of management. Moreover, while the in-
cidence of bullying or harassment may vary depending on geo-
graphical location, in Scandinavia, Germany, the United King-
dom, or the United States, the behaviors are comparable.
There is a common incidence of serious harassing/bullying be-
havior in workplaces and schools in all of the locations studied.
For research purposes, scholars distinguish among bully-
ing, harassment, and incivility, and many researchers consider
sexual harassment a separate category. Because Title VII law
requires only that harassing behavior be unwelcome, suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of
employment, and occur because of sex, the distinctions that re-
searchers draw among bullying, harassment, and incivility are
not always relevant for the law's purposes.
Unlike the narrow definitions of bullying, harassment, and
incivility, Title VII reaches behavior that creates unequal em-
ployment opportunity for men, women, masculine, and femi-
nine persons. It reaches behavior that is sexual in nature,
gendered, or gender-neutral. The only common requirements
are that the behavior occur because of sex and that it be suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive and unwelcome. As demonstrated
in Part II.C.1. below, "because of sex" includes behavior that
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intentionally treats someone differently because of sex or gen-
der, but some courts correctly conclude that it also includes be-
havior that has a differential effect on men and women and
persons who are gendered feminine and masculine.
Not all bullying or harassing behavior occurs because of
sex under this definition, but masculinities research combined
with the new research on bullying suggests that much of the
behavior occurs because of sex, even though bullying research-
ers may not define the behavior as sexual harassment. With-
out masculinities theory, many of these common behaviors ap-
pear to belong to different categories. However, masculinities
theory demonstrates the gendered structures in the workplace
and the gendered nature of much workplace behavior, even be-
havior in which gender is invisible. The theory demonstrates
that many men engage in bullying tactics in an effort to prove
their masculinity to their peers and that the behaviors rein-
force the gender norms of the workplace. Because these behav-
iors become associated with the definition of work, women may
also engage in many of these behaviors. That some women en-
gage in competitive, masculine bullying behaviors does not
mean, however, that the behavior is not gendered. Masculin-
ities theory demonstrates that the masculine practices in the
workplace harm both women and men, but the practices often
have a disparate impact on women.
2. Reasons for Denying that Bullying is Gendered
a. Definition of Gender as Relating to Biological
Sex Only
As discussed above, most bullying scholars do not define
bullying as involving gender or race. Although some scholars,
especially those in the United Kingdom and the United States,
found that men bully more than women and that men bully
women who are their superiors, a practice in which few women
engage, the Scandinavian studies conclude that bullying is not
gendered.268
The earlier Scandinavian and German scholars tended to
define sexual harassment narrowly. Ordinarily, sexual har-
assment occurs using their narrow definitions only if there are
unwanted sexual advances. However, recent research has
268. See Einarsen, supra note 93, at 386; Salin, supra note 156, at 427, 435.
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linked bullying to gender. Unlike the Scandinavian and Ger-
man scholars' narrow definition, Title VII defines illegal har-
assment to include sexualized and gendered behavior, and
should include gender-neutral behavior if the plaintiff can
prove that it occurs because of sex.269
b. Political Palatability
Deborah Lee contends that bullying scholars disagree
about whether bullying is linked to gender.270 She posits that
scholars make a political decision when they define bullying as
gender-neutral because claims of sexual and racial harassment
are met with hostility and perceived as requests for "special
treatment. '271 She argues that bullying as a gender-neutral
phenomenon is safe because it applies to all abuses of power
and does not ask for a privileged status.
Law professor David Yamada has worked at the forefront
of legal academics who apply bullying research to United
States law. He has proposed a status-blind statute that would
proscribe bullying in the workplace. His proposed statute on
bullying is similar to the law of hostile work environment un-
der Title VII.2 72 In The Phenomenon of 'Workplace Bullying"
and the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Pro-
tection,273 Professor Yamada justifies the statute by demon-
strating that American common law and statutory law do not
adequately remedy workplace bullying. 274 He models his bill
on current Title VII hostile work environment law and argues
that a reason for passing the gender-neutral, anti-bullying law
is that courts have failed to interpret Title VII to capture har-
assing behavior that is gender-neutral in cases in which there
is both sexual and gendered treatment and gender-neutral
treatment. 275 Under Yamada's proposal, a plaintiff would not
have to prove that the behavior occurred because of sex.
269. See generally Schultz, supra note 4.
270. See Lee, supra note 140, at 209.
271. Id.
272. See generally Yamada, supra note 267; see also David C. Yamada, Intro-
duction to the Symposium on Workplace Bullying: Crafting a Legislative Response
to Workplace Bullying, 8 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 475, 516-21 (2004) (in-
cluding a draft of "The Healthy Workplace Bill," which creates a cause of action
for bullying).
273. Yamada, supra note 267.
274. See id. at 493-514.
275. See id. at 512.
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Rather, she would merely have to prove that the behavior con-
stitutes illegal bullying. There is much to be said for this ap-
proach. It is pragmatic and may be the best practical method
of penalizing the behavior described. Something important is
lost, however, if we fail to recognize that men construct their
masculine identities at work at the expense of women and at
the expense of those men who are unable or unwilling to join
the harassing behaviors.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
This Subpart discusses the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court in the area of gender and sexual harassment law under
Title VII and the scholars' and lower courts' interpretation of
this jurisprudence. It focuses especially on the because of sex
element of harassment law. It then uses masculinities theory
and the new bullying research to analyze the four fact patterns
described in the Introduction and to demonstrate that often
these behaviors occur because of sex under Title VII.
A. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation in employment because of an individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin. The express language of the Act
does not mention harassment. Nonetheless, federal courts
have recognized that racial harassment creates a cause of ac-
tion under Title VII, based on an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive working environment, when that environment alters the
terms or conditions of the plaintiffs employment. For example,
in Rogers v. EEOC, the Fifth Circuit held that a Latino plaintiff
established a violation of Title VII by demonstrating that his
employer had created a hostile work environment for its Latino
workers when it treated its Latino customers with disre-
spect. 276
Lower courts subsequently found illegal harassment based
on a plaintiffs race, religion, and national origin.277 Following
276. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
277. See, e.g., Carino v. Univ. of Okla. Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th
Cir. 1984) (finding illegal discrimination on the basis of the employee's national
origin); Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 661 (8th Cir. 1980)
(finding illegal discrimination on the basis of the employee's race), affd, 702 F.2d
137 (8th Cir. 1983); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551 (6th Cir.
1975) (finding illegal discrimination on the basis of the employee's religion), va-
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the lower courts, the EEOC issued guidelines in 1980 for Title
VII liability in sexual harassment cases. The guidelines dis-
tinguished between harassment that is directly linked to an
economic quid pro quo and harassment that alters the terms or
conditions of employment because it creates an abusive envi-
ronment based on a person's sex. In either case, the guidelines
state, the conduct constitutes actionable sexual harassment
under Title VII if it has the "purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. '278
After the guidelines were issued, lower courts uniformly held
that a cause of action existed under Title VII for a hostile work
environment based on sexual harassment. 279
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 280 the United
States Supreme Court confirmed that the creation of a hostile
work environment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to al-
ter a person's work environment constitutes sex discrimination
under Title VII. The plaintiff in Meritor presented evidence
that her supervisor had subjected her to repeated demands for
sexual favors, fondling, and forcible rape. 281 Adopting the rea-
soning of the EEOC Guidelines, the Court held that the statu-
tory language prohibiting discrimination in the "terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment" protects workers from
abusive working environments based on sex, as well as race
and national origin.282
While Meritor Savings Bank recognizes a cause of action
for severe or pervasive sexual harassment, it also demonstrates
that the Court's original conception was that sexual harass-
ment arises from an interest on the part of an individual het-
erosexual male in establishing a romantic relationship with a
female employee. This conception represents a distorted view
of the behavior described in Meritor Savings Bank and most
cated, 433 U.S. 903 (1977), dismissed on remand by 561 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1977);
see also Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 657 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that
Title VII provides a cause of action for racial harassment in the workplace); Lat-
timore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 463 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that workplace
harassment may take the form of racial discrimination); Daniels v. Essex Group,
Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1991) (recognizing a Title VII claim on the ba-
sis of racial harassment).
278. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2007).
279. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-255 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
280. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
281. See id. at 60.
282. Id. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
20081 1195
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1195 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
other sexual harassment cases. It characterizes the harassing
behavior as a mistaken advance by a well-meaning man who
simply followed his natural urges and did not understand the
line between work and pleasure. A close look at the facts in
Meritor Savings Bank demonstrates, however, that the em-
ployer was less interested in a romantic relationship than in
bolstering his own power and masculinity. Michelle Vinson al-
leged that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, subjected her to four
years of continuous sexual harassment, including repeated de-
mands for sexual favors, fondling her in front of other employ-
ees, demeaning her and other female employees, and following
her into the restroom.283 His behavior, according to the plain-
tiff, culminated in forty instances of unwelcome sexual inter-
course as well as forcible rape on several occasions. 284
Less egregious but similarly offensive behavior occurred in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,285 where the male company
president targeted the female plaintiff with unwanted sexual
innuendos, name calling, suggestions that they negotiate her
raise at a hotel, and embarrassing false accusations of sexual
behavior. 28 6 The Court held that a plaintiff need not demon-
strate severe psychological damage to state a cause of action for
a hostile work environment; rather, a plaintiff proves a viola-
tion of Title VII when she shows that the harassment is suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive, by objective and subjective meas-
ures, 28 7 to alter the terms or conditions of employment.
283. Id. at 60
284. Id.
285. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
286. See id. at 18-19.
287. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)). There is a split among the circuits concerning whether the objective
standard is the "reasonable woman" standard or the "reasonable person" stan-
dard. Jurisdictions that use the "reasonable woman" standard examine whether
the behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of a
"reasonable woman" in the workplace. Those employing a "reasonable person"
standard examine the severity or pervasiveness of the behavior from the view-
point of a "reasonable person" rather than a "reasonable woman." See Gray v.
Genlyte Group, Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying the "reasonable
woman" standard in a case applying Massachusetts law); Richardson v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Correctional Services, 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999) (refusing to adopt
the "reasonable woman" standard because it would reinforce stereotypes about
women); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the "rea-
sonable woman" standard and noting that use of a "reasonable person" standard
might reinforce the "prevailing level of discrimination."). Although the Supreme
Court did not address the issue directly in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the
Court defined an objectively hostile work environment as one that "a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive." 510 U.S. at 21. Harris did not settle the
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Although Meritor Savings Bank and Harris establish im-
portant rights for plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases, the
opinions ignore the key roles that power and masculinity play
in sexual harassment. Instead of benign romantic pursuit, the
harasser's behavior in both Meritor Savings Bank and Harris
was disrespectful, coercive, demeaning, and decidedly unro-
mantic. The perpetrators in Meritor Savings Bank and Harris
sought to establish their masculinity by acquiring power over
the victims by means of intimidation, sexual innuendo, and, in
Meritor Savings Bank, rape.
After Meritor Saving Bank and Harris, lower courts and
commentators struggled with the issue of whether Title VII
created a cause of action for victims of same-sex harassment. 288
This issue was important to persons who suffered from har-
assment perpetrated by members of their own sex. But it was
also important because it made visible courts' underlying as-
sumptions in other sex harassment cases that harassment oc-
curred because of sexual desire or romantic interest. The
same-sex cases raised the question of whether Title VII forbids
only sexually harassing behavior that is motivated by sexual
desire or romantic pursuit. If not limited to the desire-
dominance motivation, the cases raised the question of whether
Title VII forbids sexual or non-sexual harassing behavior that
question of whether the reasonable woman standard is still good law. See id. On-
cale, which was decided after Harris, notes that "the objective severity of harass-
ment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plain-
tiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances."' Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). This standard
is consistent with the reasonable woman standard because it requires the fact
finder to consider the plaintiffs position. See id. at 80. The Ninth and First Cir-
cuits continue to use the "reasonable woman" standard after Harris. See, e.g.,
Craig v. M & 0 Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir., 2007); Holly D. v.
Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (using the "reasonable
woman" standard); Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2002)
(using the "reasonable woman" standard).
288. See e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th
Cir. 1997) (concluding there was a cause of action under Title VII where it was
alleged that the perpetrator was motivated by sexual attraction, but declining to
decide whether it was necessary for the perpetrator to be a homosexual for a
cause of action to lie); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 141 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding that a cause of action exists under Title VII for same sex har-
assment where the perpetrator is a homosexual); Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90
F.3d 1372, 1374, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that there was a cause of action
under Title VII where a male plaintiff was exposed to physical and verbal assaults
over two years by other men because he was subjected to disadvantageous condi-
tions at work); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that there was no cause of action under Title VII for same-sex har-
assment).
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occurs because of the sex or gender of the victim. They also
raised the question of whether sexual behavior is necessary or
sufficient for a Title VII sexual or gender harassment case. In
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,289 the Supreme
Court attempted to answer some of these questions. The case
involved egregious male-on-male harassment. Joseph Oncale,
a roustabout on a Texas oil rig, alleged that coworkers and su-
pervisors restrained him while one placed his penis on On-
cale's neck and arm, threatened to rape him, and used force to
"push a bar of soap into Oncale's anus" while he was in the
shower. 290 Oncale testified at his deposition that he quit his
job because he was afraid that he would be raped.291 The Su-
preme Court held that Title VII creates a cause of action for
sexual harassment where the harassers and the victim are of
the same sex if the environment discriminates "because of
sex."292 In Oncale, the Court suggested that there are at least
three ways to prove that the behavior occurred because of sex.
First, the plaintiff may prove that the defendant's employee
was homosexual and harbored sexual desire for the plaintiff.293
Second, the plaintiff may prove that the harasser or harassers
objected to persons of his or her sex in the workplace. 294 Third,
the plaintiff may demonstrate that there was differential
treatment of men and women at work.295 While there is debate
concerning whether these are the exclusive means of proving
that the behavior occurs because of sex,296 the Oncale Court of-
fered these means of proof as illustrative, rather than exclu-
sive. 297
Oncale gives almost no guidance as to the meaning of "be-
cause of sex," and significant confusion has resulted concerning
the interpretation of the requirement. The Supreme Court re-
manded Oncale to the lower court with instructions to allow a
fact finder to determine whether the behavior occurred because
289. 523 U.S. at 77.
290. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-119 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd and remanded, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
291. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
292. See id. at 80.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 80-81.
296. Some courts have held or assumed that these are the exclusive means of
proving that the harassment occurs because of sex. See infra note 299.
297. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
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of sex. However, the case settled days before the scheduled
trial.29 8
All federal courts of appeal that have dealt with the issue
since Oncale have concluded that the use of sexual conduct or
language alone to harass another person does not automati-
cally prove that the harassment was because of sex; however,
they disagree about the requirements for determining whether
behavior occurs because of sex. 299
Although not a sexual harassment case, Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins,300 which was decided nine years before Oncale, has
played a key role in sexual harassment law, especially in the
context of same-sex harassment. It is an important case be-
cause it expanded the definition of "because of sex" to include a
prohibition to discriminate because of a person's gender. Gen-
der, the societal expectations of the behavior of a person of a
particular biological sex, is a much broader category than bio-
logical sex. Thus, after Price Waterhouse, it is illegal to engage
in gender harassment. That is, it is illegal to harass a person
because of his failure to conform to gendered expectations. 30 1
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, a successful accountant
at the defendant firm, was denied partnership because the
partners perceived her as too masculine and aggressive. 30 2 Her
mentor explained to her that she could improve her chances of
election to partnership if she would "walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry."30 3  The Court explained that Title VII forbids
298. See Mary Judice, LA Offshore Worker Settles Sex Suit; Harassment Case
Made History in Supreme Court, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.) Oct. 24,
1998, at Cl; L.M. Sixel, Same-sex Harassment Suit Settled; Oil Rig Worker's Case
Went to Supreme Court, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 27, 1998, at 1.
299. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2006)
(assuming that there are only three ways of proving same-sex discrimination).
Compare Pedroza v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 397 F.3d 1063, 1068-70 (8th Cir. 2005)
(stating that the list in Oncale is non-exhaustive, but apparently assuming that
"bawdy" "locker room" behavior does not occur because of sex), and Dick v. Phone
Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1264 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that proving dis-
crimination because of sex by means of Oncale's first prong requires a showing
that the defendant was motivated by sexual desire but not that the defendant
identified as a homosexual), with La Day v. Catalyst Tech., 302 F.3d 474, 480 (5th
Cir. 2002) (considering the behavior of the harasser toward the victim to decide
whether there was sufficient evidence that the harasser may be homosexual).
300. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
301. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058 (7th Cir.
2003); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F. 3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000).
302. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, 250.
303. Id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hopkins v. Price Water-
house, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
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stereotyping that would place women in a double bind in a
competitive work environment:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond
the day when an employer could evaluate employees by as-
suming or insisting that they matched the stereotype asso-
ciated with their group, for " '[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Con-
gress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereo-
types.' " An employer who objects to aggressiveness in
women but whose positions require this trait places women
in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if
they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Ti-
tle VII lifts women out of this bind.30 4
The Court concluded that evidence of sex stereotyping
tainting the decision-making process in Price Waterhouse was
sufficient to prove that sex was a motivating factor in the re-
fusal to promote Hopkins. Justice O'Connor concurred, decry-
ing the use of stereotyping in employment and treating stereo-
typing of this sort as if it were direct evidence of conscious
discriminatory intent:
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the
room where partnership decisions were being made. As the
partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard sev-
eral of them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitabil-
ity for partnership. As the decisionmakers exited the room,
she was told by one of those privy to the decisonmaking
process that her gender was a major reason for the rejection
of her partnership bid.305
Under Price Waterhouse, adverse decision making result-
ing from an employee's failure to adhere to sex stereotypes is
discrimination because of sex. A number of courts have relied
on Price Waterhouse's reasoning to conclude that Title VII for-
bids sexual or gendered harassment that is directed at an indi-
vidual because of his or her failure to conform to gender norms
304. Id. at 251 (internal citations omitted); see also Bellaver v. Quanex, 200
F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment
because a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant discharged the plain-
tiff because of sex stereotyping where there was evidence that she was aggressive
but that men who were aggressive were not discharged).
305. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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and stereotypes.30 6 Price Waterhouse, combined with Oncale,
has a potentially powerful effect on same-sex harassment
cases. This issue is discussed at greater length in Part II.C.2.
below.
B. Legal Scholars' Views of Sexual Harassment
This Subpart discusses groundbreaking legal scholarship
that has analyzed the concept of sexual harassment "because of
sex." It draws upon this scholarship to elucidate workplace be-
havior and how it should be interpreted under Title VII. It also
applies the new research on masculinities theory, bullying, and
hazing that was developed above, in order to go beyond this
scholarship and suggest an even more nuanced explanation of
how "because of sex" should be interpreted under Title VII.
In Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,30 7 law professor
Vicki Schultz criticizes the sexual-desire-dominance paradigm
that underlies court decisions in sexual harassment law. Her
critique focuses on the way this model encourages courts to
consider only sexual behavior and to ignore the most damaging
gender-based behavior.308 She demonstrates that courts disag-
gregate evidence of sexual and gendered behavior into two dif-
ferent causes of action, sexual harassment and sex discrimina-
tion, a practice that led to the dismissal of many suits in which
women suffered severe, hostile work environments because of
their sex.3 09
Schultz decries courts' use of a different standard for non-
sexual harassing behavior directed at women at work, 310 and
she notes that courts do not understand that apparently neu-
tral behavior may occur because of sex. For example, Schultz
demonstrates that courts do not recognize competence-
destroying behaviors-such as refusing to train women, sabo-
306. See, e.g., Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062; Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085-86.
307. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1741.
308. See id. at 1689, 1713-16, 1720-29.
309. See id. at 1713-20. Social science research supports Schultz's argument
that much, if not most, of the harassing behavior directed at women does not re-
sult from sexual or romantic desire, but from an interest in removing the women
from the job. See, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Measuring Sexual Harassment
in the Military: The Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (SEQ-DoD), 11 MIL.
PSYCHOL. 243, 249 (1999) (concluding that "natural attraction" plays little role in
sexual harassment but that sexism plays a major role as demonstrated by re-
search results that sexual attention virtually never occurs without some form of
hostility or coercion).
310. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 1739-44.
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taging women's work, and forcing women to perform stereo-
typically female tasks-as occurring because of sex.311
Linking harassment to workplaces and jobs that are sex-
segregated, Schultz proposes that a "competence-centered"
paradigm replace the desire-dominance paradigm.312 She ob-
serves that most jobs are segregated according to gender. Men
hold "masculine" jobs that are more prestigious and better paid
than those held by women, while women hold less prestigious,
lower-paid "feminine" jobs.313 Schultz argues that men per-
ceive themselves as having a property interest in the "mascu-
line" jobs and use harassment to undermine women's compe-
tence in order to preserve the job as masculine. 314
Schultz concludes that a competence-centered paradigm
would account for same-sex harassment as well. Just as men
harass women in order to preserve the masculinity of the job
and to undermine women's competence, men may also harass
men who they see as insufficiently masculine to perform the
job. 315 Schultz proposes that the harassment is gender-based
"if it denigrates the harassee's manhood or otherwise pre-
scribes how the harassee should be or should behave on the
job."316
In What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,317 law profes-
sor Katherine Franke explores the meaning of "because of sex"
and articulates a theory to justify the conclusion that sexual
harassment is sex discrimination. She notes that courts and
scholars have advanced three justifications for finding that
sexual harassment is sex discrimination: (1) the equality prin-
ciple; (2) the anti-sex principle;,and (3) the anti-subordination
principle. 318
The equality principle uses a "but for" test to decide
whether harassment occurred because of sex. If members of
the "opposite" sex would not have been harassed by the ha-
rasser, then this principle would conclude that the behavior oc-
curred because of sex. Like Schultz, Franke rejects the sexual
desire premise. 319 Franke also criticizes the equality principle
311. See id. at 1751-54.
312. Id. at 1690-91.
313. Id. at 1756-61.
314. Id. at 1755 n.387.
315. See id. at 1777.
316. Id.
317. See Franke, supra note 21.
318. See id. at 704.
319. Id. at 732-39.
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because it grants undue attention to the subjective motivations
of the perpetrator.320 Title VII, she argues, is aimed at the con-
sequences or effects of the employment practices more than at
the motivations of the perpetrators. 321 She attacks the "but
for" test because it relies upon and emphasizes a heterosexist
approach to sex discrimination law in that it "has the effect of
reenacting and reinforcing the fundamental heterosexist as-
sumption that all or virtually all intersexual interactions have
some sexual aspect to them, and that all intrasexual interac-
tions are presumed devoid of sexual desire or interest. ' 322 By
conflating sexism and heterosexism, the law unintentionally
reinforces the "mindset that produces sexual harassment.
323
Franke also rejects the anti-sex principle. According to
Franke, sexual content does not necessarily mean that the be-
havior is discrimination "because of sex." The anti-sex princi-
ple, she argues, is too restrictive of workers' freedoms. It ig-
nores the agency of women as sexual beings and relies on a
paternalistic assumption that women do not have the capacity
to consent or object to sexual activity in the workplace. 324
Finally, Franke concludes that the anti-subordination
principle relies too heavily on the harm that men do to women
and fails to account for same-sex harassment. 325 Franke sug-
gested that the anti-subordination account would be greatly
improved if it conceptualized the problem "as one of gender
subordination defined in hetero-patriarchal terms."3
26
Franke proposes a theory of sexual harassment that de-
scribes sexual harassment as the "technology" of sexism.327 Its
purpose is to punish the failure to conform to gender norms
and to reinforce those norms. While Franke focuses less on
workplace segregation and the role the workplace plays in cre-
ating gender stereotypes, her view is very similar to that of
Schultz in that she sees harassment as occurring in order to po-
lice gender norms.
320. See id. at 745-46.
321. See id. at 745.
322. Id. at 735.
323. Id. (quoting Jane Gallop, The Lecherous Professor: A Reading,
DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD., Summer 1995, at 11).
324. See id. at 746.
325. See id. at 760.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 693.
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In The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment,328 law
professor Kathryn Abrams defends the anti-subordination
principle because it accommodates a variety of reasons for har-
assment while maintaining the focus on women's subordination
in the workplace. She argues that harassment in the work-
place is problematic because work is "a setting where women
have historically been marginalized or relegated to distinct and
limited roles and where they continue to face hostility and sys-
tematic obstacles to professional progress. '329 Because work
provides the locus of women's potential liberation and resis-
tance to discrimination, Abrams explains, harassment at work
is especially destructive. Abrams notes that harassing prac-
tices may either intentionally or unintentionally drive women
out of the workforce and, in doing so, preserve male control
over the job. 330 Abrams criticizes Franke for her failure to fo-
cus on what sexual harassment means for women in the work-
place; she emphasizes the importance of the workplace as a
place of women's resistance to male subjugation.33 1
Like Schultz, Abrams argues that sexual harassment
functions as a means of establishing male control in the work-
place and of perpetuating masculine norms at work. 332 She
notes that some forms of harassment are aggressive, while oth-
ers are more subtle. Even when directed at individual women,
sexual harassment operates against women as a group, sending
the message that women do not belong in the job or work-
place.333 Moreover, like Schultz, Abrams notes that the reaf-
firmation of masculine norms is accomplished by denigrating
the female at work. 334 Masculine practices, such as circulating
pornography or bagging, according to Abrams, "express a
vaguely sexualized form of masculine camaraderie. '335
While there are differences in the theories presented by
Schultz, Franke, and Abrams, there is also substantial agree-
ment among all three scholars that the sexual de-
328. See Abrams, supra note 22.
329. Id. at 1185.
330. See id. at 1198.
331. See id. at 1170, 1198. Abrams also criticizes the work of Bernstein, supra
note 23, who advocates a gender neutral approach and a focus on the dignity of
the individual. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 1185.
332. See id. at 1205.
333. See id. at 1206-08.
334. See id. at 1209.
335. Id. at 1211.
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sire/dominance paradigm is not a proper theoretical foundation
for sexual harassment law.
How would these authors decide the four types of cases
posed in the Introduction? Abrams, who focuses on sexual har-
assment law as a means of avoiding the subordination of
women at work, would likely agree that in the first case, where
a group of men in a formerly all-male workplace harasses a
woman using means that are not specifically directed at the
woman, the woman has a cause of action for hostile work envi-
ronment. Even though women are not specifically targeted in
workplaces, if the workplace is sex segregated and permeated
with behavior and comments derogatory to women as sexual
objects, Abrams would likely take the position that the behav-
ior should be regulated because it subordinates women to male
power in the workplace, an important location of women's re-
sistance. Schultz and Franke do not comment on this particu-
lar fact pattern, but they, too, may agree. As we shall see,
however, at least one court reads Schultz to conclude that sex-
ual behavior, even when it is degrading to women, does not
create a hostile work environment for women. 336 Franke might
criticize courts for using the "but for" analysis where the behav-
ior occurred before women entered the workforce and continues
after their presence in the workforce.
In the second case, where men harass other men for not
conforming to gender norms, all would agree that same sex
harassing behavior aimed at punishing gender non-conforming
men violates Title VII because it alters the terms and condi-
tions of employment based on gender. All would likely be con-
cerned with courts' attempts to distinguish between discrimi-
nation because of sex and because of sexual orientation, but
Franke may be particularly troubled since courts' analyses re-
inforce a heterosexist interpretation of the law.
Neither Schultz nor Abrams deals directly with the third
case, in which men harass men through hazing and horseplay
in an all male environment. Schultz focuses on the male perpe-
trators' motivation to undermine the competence of the women
or gender non-conforming men who are harassed in order to as-
sure that the job remain a masculine job. Hazing and horse-
play, however, are directed at gender-conforming men in order
to assure that the men are tough enough to do the masculine
336. See Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 364-365 (4th Cir.
2002), rev'd en banc, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003).
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job. Like the behavior Schultz describes, the hazing and horse-
play assure that the job remains a masculine job. While
Abrams also is concerned about undermining women as em-
ployees, her work does not deal with hazing of male employees
in order to assure the masculinity of the job's holders and of the
jobs themselves.
Franke, in contrast, explores hazing and horseplay, but
she concludes that, although there should be liability under Ti-
tle VII, the issue is one of standing.337 She would require that
a man indicate his objections to his coworkers and then be tar-
geted because of his failure to conform to workplace norms in
order to prove that he has suffered a Title VII violation. 338 Al-
though recognizing that this is a higher standard than other
hostile work environment cases, she finds the higher standard
acceptable because the larger cultural norms of women as sex
objects and men as sex subjects are not reproduced by this con-
duct. Furthermore, she concludes that it would be inadvisable
for the law to dismantle every hyper-masculine and hyper-
feminine workplace because such a result would impose ortho-
doxy. 339
Finally, none of the three scholars deals directly with the
fourth case, in which harassment is directed at women but con-
tains no sexual or gendered content. All three scholars would
likely conclude that the content of the behavior is irrelevant so
long as there is proof that the behavior occurred because of sex.
Schultz specifically argues that courts should aggregate all
harassment that is sexual, gendered and gender-neutral in or-
der to determine whether a hostile work environment occurred
because of sex. She criticizes courts for not understanding that
gender-neutral behavior, such as a failure to train, often occurs
because of sex. Because Schultz argues that the history of the
hostile work environment cause of action would require courts
to consider gender-based and gender-neutral behavior as well
as sexual behavior, it is unlikely that she would conclude that a
case with gender-neutral behavior alone cannot occur because
of sex. It is likely that all three scholars would agree that gen-
der-neutral harassing behavior can occur because of sex and a
cause of action should exist even where the behavior is gender
neutral. The problem is that it is very difficult to prove that
gender-neutral harassing behavior occurs because of gender.
337. See Franke, supra note 21, at 768-69.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 769.
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The issue, as discussed in Part II.C.4. below, will likely be a
proof issue. Masculinities theory and the new bullying re-
search that links gender to bullying may help resolve those
proof problems.
C. Lower Courts'Jurisprudence of "Because of Sex" Pre-
and Post-Oncale
With this introduction to masculinities theory, bullying re-
search, and the legal theories of Schultz, Franke, and Abrams,
this Article returns to the four scenarios posed in the Introduc-
tion to discover how courts have handled them and how mascu-
linities theory and bullying research can enlighten the decision
making.
1. Men's Non-Directed Harassment of Women in
Male Jobs
This category includes behavior that is sexist and sexual
but may not be directed specifically at a particular woman in a
man's job. Examples of this behavior include the prevalence of
pictures and calendars depicting women as sexual objects and
derogatory comments about women that are not directed at a
particular woman. In many workplaces, this environment pre-
existed the women's employment in the workplace.
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.340 offers a pre-
Oncale example of this type of behavior. In Robinson, the
plaintiff was one of a very few women welders in a shipyard.341
The court found that the environment was saturated with
"girlie" calendars and nude, erotic photographs of women. 342
The men who worked in the shipyard also subjected the plain-
tiff and other women to direct harassing behavior based on
their sex. When Robinson complained, the harassment esca-
lated. 343
The court concluded that the nude photographs of women
that were evident throughout the workplace, along with the
behavior of coworkers, created a hostile work environment for
the women. Based on expert testimony and the plaintiffs tes-
timony, the court concluded that the presence of the pictures
340. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
341. See id. at 1491.
342. Id. at 1493-97.
343. See id. at 1514-16.
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had a disproportionate effect on women workers. 344 It noted
that display of the pictures fell into a category of actionable
conduct "that creates a barrier to the progress of women in the
workplace because it conveys the message that they do not be-
long, that they are welcome in the workplace only if they will
subvert their identities to the sexual stereotypes prevalent in
that environment. '345
Citing to an earlier article by Kathryn Abrams, the court
concluded that the "social context" defense, which, in effect,
asks that women assume the risk of injury from offensive har-
assing behavior in a rough, male, blue-collar environment, is
inconsistent with Title VII's promise of equal employment op-
portunity. 346 The court stated: "A pre-existing atmosphere that
deters women from entering or continuing in a profession or job
is no less destructive to and offensive to workplace equality
than a sign declaring 'Men Only."'347 This behavior is action-
able as sexual harassment even if it existed before the women
entered the work environment, and even if the posting of the
offensive materials did not originate with the intent to offend
women workers.348 The key, according to the court, is whether
the behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms or conditions of a reasonable woman's working environ-
ment. It is not necessary that all women be offended by the
behavior. 349
In Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.,350 another case de-
cided before Oncale, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected the defendant's argument that the supervisor yelled at
344. See id. at 1522-23.
345. Id. at 1523.
346. Id. at 1526 (citing Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212 n.l18 (1989))
(citation omitted).
347. Id.
348. See id. at 1522-23.
349. See id. at 1525. The court also rejected the defendant's arguments that
the lewd pictures constituted the employer's protected speech, concluding that al-
though the speech may have been protected outside of the workplace, certain
speech can be regulated in the workplace. Id. at 1535. Here, the women were a
captive audience, the restriction was a time, place, and manner restriction and
not a total ban. Id. Moreover, the court noted, the employer did not claim that it
sought to express itself by means of sexually-oriented pictures or verbal harass-
ment. Id. at 1534. Even if the speech were protected, the court concluded, the
governmental interest in protecting the women's interest would outweigh the em-
ployer's speech interest. See id. at 1534-35. But see Eugene Volokh, What Speech
Does "Hostile Work Environment" Law Protect?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997) (arguing
that sexual harassment law unlawfully restricts employee speech).
350. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
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both men and women, and therefore, his behavior was not di-
rected at Steiner because of her sex.35 1 The court noted that
the supervisor's abusive treatment of men and women dif-
fered-his yelling at women was of a sexual or gender-specific
nature, whereas the abuse of the men did not include gender-
specific terminology. 352
Furthermore, the court observed that the supervisor could
not cure his abuse toward the women by using "sexual epithets
equal in intensity and in an equally degrading manner against
male employees,"353 because the standard for determining
whether a hostile work environment exists is whether a rea-
sonable woman would find the environment hostile. The court
further noted that "although words from a man to a man are
differently received than words from a man to a woman, we do
not rule out the possibility that both men and women working
at Showboat have viable claims against Trenkle for sexual har-
assment."3
54
After Oncale, defendants have argued, and some courts
have agreed, that when men and women are both subjected to
offensive sexual behavior or comments, and the behavior is not
directed specifically at one sex, the behavior does not occur be-
cause of sex.355 For example, in Ocheltree v. Scollon Produc-
351. Her supervisor called her offensive gender-based names such as "dumb
fucking broad," "cunt," and "fucking cunt." Id. at 1461. He also reprimanded
Steiner because she "comped" a breakfast for two men who had played blackjack
at her table. Id. The supervisor approached her in a threatening manner and
yelled, "[w]hy don't you go in the restaurant and suck their dicks while you are at
it if you want to comp them so bad?" Id.
352. Id. The court stated:
The numerous depositions of Showboat employees reveal that Trenkle
was indeed abusive to men, but that his abuse of women was different.
It relied on sexual epithets, offensive, explicit references to women's bod-
ies and sexual conduct. While Trenkle may have referred to men as
"assholes," he referred to women as "dumb fucking broads" and "fucking
cunts," and when angry at Steiner, suggested that she have sex with cus-
tomers. And while his abuse of men in no way related to their gender,
his abuse of female employees, especially Steiner, centered on the fact
that they were females. It is one thing to call a woman "worthless," and
another to call her a "worthless broad."
Id. at 1463-64 (citation omitted).
353. Id. at 1464.
354. Id. (noting also that racially derogatory language, such as "UFO's-ugly
fucking orientals . . .differs fundamentally" from less specific terms like "jerk"
and "asshole").
355. See, e.g., Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002),
rev'd en banc, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003); cf. Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399,
403-04 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding dismissal of the complaint where both husband
and wife alleged that the same supervisor propositioned each one of them for sex;
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tions, Inc.,356 the plaintiff was the only woman working among
ten or eleven men in a shop that produced costumes. 357 During
the first year, the shop became increasingly polluted with sex-
ual banter and sexual conduct. Three incidents were directed
specifically at the plaintiff: a vulgar song, a book with pierced
male genitals, and a pantomime of sexual acts with manne-
quins. 358 There was also evidence that male coworkers touched
mannequins in sexual ways when the plaintiff walked by, and
that the plaintiff was berated for calling her son who was home
recovering from a broken tailbone. The company Vice Presi-
dent commented that if the plaintiff did not like his rule that
she should not use the telephone, she should go home and be a
housewife because she was not cut out for work at the defen-
dant's place of business.359
Additionally, there was daily sexual banter that included
use of profanity, male coworkers' use of explicit sexual insults
to bother one another, and protracted discussion of their sexual
exploits with their wives or girlfriends in extremely graphic
terms.360 Much of this discussion took a decidedly misogynist
character. For example, the workers made comments about
sexual experiences such as, "she swallowed, she gave good
head, .. . I fucked her all night long."361 One employee spoke
about his wife "sucking his dick and swallowing and letting it
run down the side of her face. '362
Because the Fourth Circuit concluded that the three inci-
dents obviously directed at the plaintiff were not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of her em-
ployment, and that the other comments and gestures were not
directed specifically at the plaintiff, it held that the behavior
could not have occurred because of her sex. It overturned the
lower court's denial of the defendant's Rule 50 motion for
because the defendant allegedly subjected both men and women to the behavior,
he was an "equal opportunity harasser" and the behavior could not have occurred
because of either's sex).
356. 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002).
357. See id. at 367 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judg-
ment in part).
358. See id. at 368.
359. See id.
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judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict for the plain-
tiff.363
The majority in Ocheltree cites Vicki Schultz' and other
feminists' work for the proposition that eliminating sexual con-
tent in the workplace is not a valuable goal of sexual harass-
ment jurisprudence, and that women are as comfortable as
men in a sexually explicit workplace. 364 It concluded that to
permit sexual harassment law to regulate sexual content at
work would be an attempt "to transmute Title VII into a neo-
Victorian chivalry code designed to protect what the dissent
imagines to be the tender sensitivities of contemporary
women," and would constitute preferential and paternalistic
treatment of women. 365
The dissent argued that there was evidence in the record
from which one could reasonably conclude that men and
women were treated differently. 366 Moreover, the dissent cited
to Schultz, Franke, and Abrams to argue that the environment
may have occurred because of sex for two reasons: first, the be-
havior occurred in order to rattle the plaintiff; and second,
given the context, the behavior had a disparate effect on a rea-
sonable woman employee. 367 The dissent agreed with Schultz'
position that sexual content is not automatically discriminatory
or demeaning to women. 368 However, the dissent posited that,
based on the context of the sex segregated workplace and the
tone of the comments, a reasonable jury could conclude that the
harassment of the plaintiff was "rooted in male resentment of
Ocheltree's intrusion into 'their' workplace and in resentment
of her demands that they clean up their act. '369 The dissent
stated:
[A] reasonable jury could find that even if very few of the
sexual remarks were made in response to Ocheltree's pres-
ence in the production shop, her male coworkers' relentless,
graphic descriptions of their sex lives count as sex-based
harassment because they portray women as sexually subor-
363. See id. at 358-66 (majority opinion). This decision was affirmed in part
and reversed in part when the case was reviewed en banc. See 335 F.3d 325 (4th
Cir. 2003) (en banc).
364. See Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 364 (citing Schultz, supra note 4, at 1794).
365. Id. at 365.
366. Id. at 372 (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment
in part).
367. See id. at 367-76.
368. See id. at 374 (citing Schultz, supra note 4, at 1795).
369. Id. (citing Abrams, supra note 22, at 1211).
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dinate to men. Ocheltree's coworkers made her uncomplain-
ing submission to an atmosphere suffused with degrading
images of female sexuality an implicit condition of her em-
ployment, and this harassment was 'because of sex' in the
sense that it made the workplace more hostile to Ocheltree
precisely because she was a woman.370
The dissent noted that the behavior of the men portrayed
women as sexually subordinate to men and could be considered
sexual harassment because the comments reinforced a hierar-
chical gender regime in which men are portrayed as sexual
subjects and women as sexual objects. 371 Without attempting
to speak for Professor Schultz, it appears that the dissent un-
derstood her message better than the majority in this case.
While Schultz argued that courts unduly focus on sexual be-
havior in their sexual harassment jurisprudence, her article
should not be interpreted to conclude that sexual behavior can
never constitute part or all of a hostile work environment.
Moreover, Schultz focused on the problem of sex segregation in
the workplace and the reaction by groups of male coworkers to
the introduction of women into those workplaces. This fact
pattern seems to illustrate Professor Schultz' competence
paradigm-that is, men in formerly all-male, masculine jobs
harass women in order to undermine their competence and to
preserve the job as a male enclave. It appears, based on the
context of this case, that it is a permissible inference that the
men subjected Ocheltree to severe, misogynist behavior in or-
der to undermine her competence, to drive her from the work-
force, and to establish the shop and the job as masculine. It
seems less likely that either they were unaware of Ocheltree's
presence in making their comments or that they believed that
she was enjoying the banter.
Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit overturned the panel
decision. In an opinion written by Judge Michael, who had dis-
sented in the panel decision, the Fourth Circuit held that there
was sufficient evidence that the discussions which took place in
the plaintiffs presence were aimed at the plaintiff in order to
make her uncomfortable. 372 A reasonable jury could therefore
conclude that the behavior occurred because of her sex.373 Cu-
370. Id. at 370.
371. See id. at 374-75 (citing Abrams, supra note 22, at 1205-25; Franke, su-
pra note 21, at 762-72).
372. Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2003).
373. Id. at 332-33.
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riously, the en banc opinion did not discuss the question of
whether behavior that is more offensive to women because of
its degrading content may occur because of sex even if it is not
directed specifically at women in the workplace. 374 The en
banc court did not reach the thorny question of whether a
plaintiff may prove that offensive behavior occurs because of
sex if the behavior is not directed specifically at women but has
a disparate effect on women because it is more offensive to
them.
A few other courts have reached this question and con-
cluded that courts should consider subjectively different reac-
tions women may have to similar treatment. For example, in
Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 375 the Second Circuit overturned the
lower court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on a
hostile work environment claim. 376 The court reasoned that
even though both men and women were exposed to the hostile
environment and even though the conduct ridiculed some men,
it "also frequently touted the sexual exploits of others. '377
Moreover, the court noted, "the depiction of women in the of-
fensive jokes and graphics was uniformly sexually demeaning
and communicated the message that women as a group were
available for sexual exploitation by men. ' 378 The court con-
cluded that "[sluch workplace disparagement of women, re-
peated day after day over the course of several years without
supervisory intervention, stands as a serious impediment to
374. Because of the procedural posture, the question was whether the lower
court had properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at 327. The en banc court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of dif-
ferential treatment. Id. at 332-33.
375. 385 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004).
376. The plaintiff submitted evidence that the workplace was permeated by
offensive profanity and crude humor, including comments by male workers who
insulted one another by bragging about imaginary sexual exploits of their cowork-
ers' wives. See id. at 214 n.3. The plaintiff was also subject to sexually harassing
behavior directed at her. Id. at 214-15. The plaintiff was physically attacked
from behind in a parking lot by a coworker who groped and kissed her; other co-
workers made frequent disparaging remarks about her 'ass,' her 'tits,' her men-
strual cycle, her weight, and her eating habits, and at least one terminal-box
drawing depicted her performing a sex act on a supervisor." Id. at 215. Her su-
pervisor made hostile gender-based comments about her, referring to Petrosino as
"a damn woman," and "telling her to calm her 'big tits down."' Id. Another man-
ager stated that women were too "simple,' 'too sensitive,' and 'too damn thin-
skinned."' Id. Petrosino was told to 'keep her mouth shut"' when she tried to
complain about the environment. Id. at 216.
377. Id. at 222.
378. Id.
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any woman's efforts to deal professionally with her male col-
leagues ."379
In a case that took place in a predominantly female work-
place, EEOC v. National Education Association,380 the EEOC
brought suit on behalf of three women who worked for the
NEA, alleging that they were subjected to a hostile work envi-
ronment. According to evidence in the record, the interim di-
rector created a general atmosphere of intimidation in the
workplace and women were afraid of him.38' The trial court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, con-
cluding that there was insufficient evidence that the treatment
was because of sex. 382 The Ninth Circuit overturned the lower
court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that the lower
court erred when it held that the defendant's acts must be ei-
ther of a sexual nature or motivated by discriminatory animus
toward women. 383 The Ninth Circuit stated that in a work-
place where there is a majority of women, the evidence raised
the inference that the interim director was "more comfortable
when bullying women than when bullying men."384
In determining whether a hostile work environment occurs
because of sex, the Ninth Circuit looked to the differences be-
tween the objective treatment of men and women and the sub-
jective effects of that treatment. 385 The court noted that there
was sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that the
women were treated more harshly than men and that there
was a marked difference in the subjective effects on the
women. 386 This case goes beyond Steiner because it concludes
379. Id. Petrosino adopted the views expressed in the dissenting opinion in
Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (Newman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Petrosino, 385 F.3d at 222. In
Brennan, Judge Newman opined that "commonality of exposure cannot be permit-
ted to defeat all claims of gender discrimination," and explained that the determi-
nation of whether discrimination occurs through exposure to sexual or racially
provocative displays "turns in large part on the perspective . . . of a reasonable
person or that of a reasonable member of the protected class." 192 F.3d at 320.
Like Judge Newman in Brennan, the majority in Petrosino rejected the defen-
dant's "argument that the common exposure of male and female workers to sexu-
ally offensive material necessarily precludes a woman from relying on such evi-
dence to establish a hostile work environment based on sex." Petrosino, 385 F.3d
at 223.
380. 422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005).
381. See id. at 843-44.
382. Id. at 842.
383. Id. at 844-45.
384. Id. at 845.
385. Id. at 845-46.
386. Id. at 846.
1214 [Vol. 79
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1214 2008
CREATING MASCULINE IDENTITIES
that evidence of differences in the effects that behavior has on
men and women is relevant to the question of whether the be-
havior occurred because of sex "even where the conduct is not
facially sex-or gender-specific. 387
The key question in these cases is whether "because of sex"
requires a conscious intent to create a hostile work environ-
ment for women because they are women. Cases holding that
the hostile work environment is not actionable if both men and
women are exposed to the same environment implicitly read
the statute to require that the creator of a hostile work envi-
ronment have the conscious intent to do so. In iViva la
Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII,388 I
analyzed Title VII jurisprudence and concluded that the "be-
cause of sex" requirement refers to causation rather than a
conscious intent in discrimination cases.389 Other authors have
agreed. 390 Whether other discrimination cases require a con-
scious intent or not, hostile work environment cases have never
required a conscious intent on the part of the perpetrator. 391
This is obvious from the 1980 EEOC guidance, which has been
applied by courts ever since. The guidance states that harass-
ing conduct creates actionable sexual harassment under Title
VII if it has the "purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimi-
dating, hostile, or offensive working environment. ' 392 By its
terms, the guidance requires plaintiffs to prove either the in-
tent or the effect of the behavior was discriminatory because of
the person's sex or gender. It does not require a conscious in-
tent to offend because of sex. While the term "because of sex"
could be interpreted to mean that the conscious intent of the
perpetrator is to harm someone because of his or her sex or
gender, the sexual harassment cases do not focus on intent. It
makes more sense to conclude, given the language of the guid-
387. Id.
388. Ann C. McGinley, iViva la Evoluci6n!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415 (2000).
389. See id. at 419, 477-79.
390. See, e.g., Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity
Presumption and the Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177,
1192 (2003) (noting that courts employed the Title VII proof constructs to capture
both conscious and unconscious decision making before Hicks); Melissa Hart, Sub-
jective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 745
(2005) (concluding that unconscious discrimination plays a "significant role" in
employment decisions).
391. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
392. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2007).
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ance, that the "because of sex" requirement is a causation,
rather than an intent, requirement. Using a causation re-
quirement, rather than a conscious-intent requirement, a per-
petrator's actions resulting from unconscious or hidden stereo-
types can fulfill the "because of sex" requirement. This
conclusion is consistent with Price Waterhouse's holding that
discriminatory behavior based on gender stereotypes occurs be-
cause of sex and violates Title VII. Gender stereotypes may be
consciously or unconsciously held by the actor.
The few cases that conclude that behavior having a dispa-
rate effect on women can occur because of sex may create a
tempest in a teapot. They include behavior that is specifically
directed at women and behavior that is not.393 If courts prop-
erly analyze the evidence, they will look at the totality of the
evidence to determine whether it is sufficiently severe or per-
vasive to create an illegal hostile work environment. 394 But
even when there is evidence of specific mistreatment of the
plaintiff because of her sex or gender, some courts, like the
Fourth Circuit panel in Ocheltree, disaggregate the evidence. 395
These same courts conclude that the behavior is not because of
sex if it is not directed at the plaintiff and therefore cannot be
included in the analysis of whether a sexually hostile work en-
vironment existed.396 Because some behavior is directed at
women in these cases, courts should aggregate all of the behav-
ior to determine whether it is sufficiently severe or pervasive.
Nonetheless, a reading of the term "because of sex" that
takes into account a woman's reasonable reaction will better
serve one essential purpose of Title VII: to create equal em-
ployment opportunity by eliminating discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment. Workplaces that are saturated with
misogynist comments and behavior, whether or not they are
specifically directed at women, make it more difficult for many
393. See, e.g., Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994),
discussed supra notes 350-54 and accompanying text; EEOC v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n,
422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005), discussed supra notes 380-87 and accompanying
text.
394. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), discussed supra notes
285-87 and accompanying text.
395. See e.g., Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002), dis-
cussed supra note 356-74 and accompanying text; Petrosino v. Bell Atl., No. 99
CV 4072(JG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4616, at *19-22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2003),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 385 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2004), discussed supra notes 375-
79 and accompanying text.
396. See Ocheltree, 308 F.3d at 356-58; Petrosino, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4616,
at *19-20.
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women to perform their work. Women in these workplaces are
seen not as colleagues and competent workers, but as inferior
intruders because they are women. This environment is anti-
thetical to one's ability to succeed at work. 397
Masculinities theory supports this interpretation. Mascu-
linities theorists observe that men engage in homosocial com-
petitive behavior in order to prove their masculinity to other
men. 398 The presence of women in the organization provides
men the opportunity to prove their manhood to other men.399
The process of constructing masculinity, social scientists con-
clude, is not only about demonstrating the commonalities
among men; it also requires a highlighting of difference. 400
When women enter "men's" jobs, the men use the women as
foils, permitting men to demonstrate what they are not.40 1
This behavior, which includes the exploitation of women and
the derogation of the feminine, not only reinforces the mascu-
linity of the job and the men performing it, but also creates
structural disincentives for women to work in these jobs.40 2
A workplace in which both men and women are exposed to
misogynist behavior and/or language and jokes creates a hos-
tile environment for women because of their sex. By making it
more difficult for women to be taken seriously as workers, a
397. Professor Volokh would argue that the government should not restrict this
speech. See Volokh, supra note 349, at 647-48. The Supreme Court, however, has
interpreted the First Amendment rights of employees narrowly. See, e.g., Garcetti
v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422-26 (2006) (holding that an assistant district attor-
ney's complaint about the use of perjured information was not protected by the
First Amendment).
398. See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and
Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM & MASCULINITIES 182,
185 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004). For a more thorough explanation of masculin-
ities theory, see generally McGinley, supra note 29.
399. See Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, 'There Oughtta Be a Law Against
Bitches' Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training, in 9 GENDER, WORK &
ORG. 439, 441 (2002).
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Vicki Schultz notes that women are harassed most frequently when they
occupy jobs that are segregated. In jobs historically occupied by men, women suf-
fer harassment because men associate their jobs with masculinity and police the
jobs by harassing women and gender non-conforming men. The harassment oc-
curs as a result of women's job segregation and continues to reinforce it. See Vicki
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2132 (2003). This conclu-
sion is consistent with masculinities theory. Men harass women to reaffirm
themselves as powerful and masculine in the view of other men. See, e.g., Thomas
Dunk & David Bartol, The Logic and Limitations of Male Working-Class Culture
in a Resource Hinterland, in SPACES OF MASCULINITIES 39 (Bettina van Hoven &
Kathrin Horschelmann eds., 2005); Collinson & Hearn, supra note 33, at 294-98.
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misogynist environment has a disparate negative effect on
women's terms or conditions of employment.
Julie Ahearn Greene, in Blue Collar Women at Work with
Men,40 3 catalogued a compelling example of misogynist work-
places. She described extensive interviews with seventeen wo-
men working in blue-collar jobs. The women encountered de-
grading gender treatment, some of which was explicitly sexual
or gendered and some of which appeared to be caused by their
sex or gender, although sex or gender was not explicit. 404 The
treatment included assault and threats of assault, inadequate
training, inappropriate work assignments, subjection to men
who exposed themselves regularly, verbal harassment, and
derogation of their job competency. 405 It would undermine the
purposes of Title VII to conclude that this behavior does not oc-
cur because of sex.
This behavior is not limited to blue-collar jobs. Sociologists
Margaret and David Collinson studied sexual harassment of
women managers in insurance sales. 406 Women were isolated
not only from the men, but also from one another.407 The men
used a "divide and conquer" strategy in which they spoke dis-
paragingly to each woman about the other women. 408 In re-
sponse, the women distanced themselves from the other women
at work.409 But this response did not protect the women. 4 10 No
matter what response the women attempted to make-
speaking out against the harassment, ignoring the harassment,
or trying to be "one of the guys"-the management enabled the
harasser by blaming the harassment on the women's reac-
tion.411 The authors found that the small number of women in
the male environment occupying traditional male jobs "seems
to reinforce men's highly masculine culture and solidarity. Re-
403. JEANIE AHEARN GREENE, BLUE COLLAR WOMEN AT WORK WITH MEN
(2006).
404. See id. at 147 (describing inadequate training and inappropriate work as-
signments as having a gender component).
405. See id. Greene's interviews also revealed that some of the men-the "good
guys"-treated the women with respect and mentored them. Id. at 131.
406. Margaret Collinson & David Collinson, 'It's Only Dick The Sexual Har-
assment of Women Managers in Insurance Sales, in 10 WORK, EMP. & SOC'Y 29
(1996).
407. Id. at 49.
408. Id. at 43, 49.
409. Id. at 42-49.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 42-43.
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ducing women entrants to sexual objects of ridicule, the domi-
nant male culture reproduced and even reinforced itself. '412
The introduction of the women into the male dominated
workplaces in Greene's and the Collinsons' accounts resulted in
harassing behavior that courts would agree is sufficiently se-
vere or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment.
Masculinities theory demonstrates that courts should also
agree that there is at least a question of fact concerning
whether the behavior occurred because of sex.
2. Men Harassing Men Who Do Not Conform to
Gender Norms
Since Oncale, plaintiffs in same-sex hostile work environ-
ment cases have used the sex stereotyping doctrine of Price
Waterhouse, with varying degrees of success, to prove that their
harassment occurred because of sex.413 Male plaintiffs com-
pare their situation to that of Ann Hopkins, who was denied
partner status because she did not live up to the ideals of femi-
ninity held by the partners. Male coworkers and supervisors
harass male plaintiffs, they argue, because they do not embody
the traditional ideal of masculinity.414  Many post-Oncale
courts accept that the Hopkins stereotyping doctrine applies to
hostile work environment harassment cases.4 15 They struggle,
however, with the question of whether the hostile work envi-
ronment is due to sex stereotyping, which would create a cause
of action under Title VII, or to the alleged victim's sexual orien-
tation (or perceived sexual orientation), which they hold is not
covered by Title VII.416 The cases demonstrate that drawing
this line is virtually impossible.417
412. Id. at 45.
413. See cases cited infra note 419.
414. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1063-66
(7th Cir. 2003); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1082-85 (7th Cir.
2000).
415. See, e.g., Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1064 (accepting the use of the Hopkins sex
stereotyping theory where applicable, but concluding that the plaintiffs case was
not a sex stereotyping case as a matter of law); Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (af-
firming lower court's grant of summary judgment because evidence showed that
plaintiff was harassed because of his apparent homosexuality, and not sexual
stereotyping). But see David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The Cau-
sation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1743 (2002)
(concluding that Oncale does not stand for the proposition that harassment based
on non-conformity to gender norms is sex discrimination).
416. See, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006)
(agreeing that Price Waterhouse creates a cause of action for sex discrimination
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Since Oncale, the courts of appeal are split. A number of
courts have held that the plaintiff made out a cause of action
for sex stereotyping. 418 With nearly identical facts, others have
held that the plaintiff did not; in this latter group, courts have
held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff was harassed be-
cause of his sexual orientation or perceived homosexuality
rather than for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes. 419
based on an individual's failure to conform with gendered expectations, but hold-
ing as a matter of law that the plaintiffs complaint could be interpreted only to
allege a cause of action for discrimination based on homosexuality or perceived
homosexuality); Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.
2003) (upholding grant of summary judgment to the defendant because, although
the plaintiff suffered assaults in the scrotum, he did not prove the defendant was
motivated by the plaintiffs sex); Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062 (affirming the district
court's grant of summary judgment in Title VII case alleging same-sex hostile
work environment because the evidence supported only work performance con-
flicts or harassment based on perceived sexual orientation, not sex stereotyping).
But see Nichols v. Sanchez, 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
plaintiff, an effeminate man, had a cause of action under Title VII and the Price
Waterhouse sex-stereotyping theory for same-sex hostile work environment har-
assment where his coworkers subjected him to taunts).
417. One court states that such a claim requires navigating the tricky legal
waters of male-on-male sex harassment. See Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1062.
418. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (9th Cir.
2002) (en banc) (plurality decision reversing the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, with three judges concluding that Rene had preserved
his case of sex stereotyping for appeal where the plaintiff was openly gay and his
coworkers had teased him about the way he walked, whistled at him, caressed his
buttocks, blew kisses at him, touched his body and his face, and called him
"muneca," or doll); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872-73 (holding that the district court im-
properly granted judgment in a bench trial to the defendant where plaintiffs male
coworkers and a supervisor subjected him to name-calling by referring to him as
"her" and "she," mocked him for carrying a tray "like a woman" and for not having
sex with a waitress who was his friend, and called him "faggot" and "fucking fe-
male whore"); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that the lower court improperly granted a motion to dismiss a heterosexual
male's claim alleging that his coworkers harassed him, called him a "homo" and
"jerk off," unbuttoned his clothing, patted him on the buttocks, asked him to per-
form sexual acts, scratched his crotch, and humped his door frame, concluding
that "simply because some of the harassment alleged by Schmedding includes
taunts of being homosexual or other epithets connoting homosexuality, the com-
plaint is [not] thereby transformed from one alleging harassment based on sex to
one alleging harassment based on sexual orientation").
419. See, e.g., Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763 (agreeing that Price Waterhouse creates
a cause of action for sex discrimination based on an individual's failure to conform
to gendered expectations but holding as a matter of law that the plaintiffs com-
plaint could be interpreted only to allege a cause of action based on discrimination
based on homosexuality or perceived homosexuality); Hamm, 332 F.3d 1058 (af-
firming grant of summary judgment to defendant because no reasonable jury
could conclude that the harassment plaintiff suffered was sex stereotyping rather
than a result of his work performance or perceived homosexuality where cowork-
ers regularly threatened plaintiff in vulgar terms, called him "faggot," "isexual,"
and "girl scout," passed rumors that he was gay, and warned others not to bend
1220 [Vol. 79
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These cases are factually indistinguishable. They all arose in
an all-male, or virtually all-male, environment.420 In all of the
cases, coworkers and/or supervisors used vulgar verbal taunts
as well as physical attacks, often to sexual organs of the victim,
to harass the victim. Moreover, the taunts invariably included
comments questioning the victim's masculinity and his sexual
orientation. Terms such as "bitch," "fag," "queer," "homo," and
"sissy," actions such as grabbing of testicles, questions asking
whether a person is male or female or "takes it up the ass," and
threats of rape are common to all of the cases. 42 1 It would be
over in front of him); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260,
264 (3d Cir. 2001) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment because
the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that the harassment was because
of sex where the plaintiff, a gay man, was assaulted at work and told by his as-
saulter "everybody knows you're a faggot," and "everybody knows you take it up
the ass," called a "sissy," mistreated by his supervisors, and where he had alleged
he was discriminated against because of his sexual orientation).
420. There are cases in which women, mostly in predominantly female envi-
ronments, allege that other women created a hostile work environment because of
the plaintiffs' sex, but because these cases are so few it is difficult to draw any
generalizations from them. See, e.g., Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d
1256, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 2005) (reversing the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the defendant where the female plaintiff alleged that her female co-
workers and supervisor engaged in various behaviors including attempting to
pinch the plaintiff's breasts, shoving a sex toy in the shape of a penis toward the
plaintiff, and making references to oral sex while bending over without wearing
underwear because a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff had demon-
strated that the harassers were motivated by sexual desire under Oncale's first
prong); Pedroza v. Cintas Corp., 397 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming
lower court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant where the female
plaintiff alleged that the female harasser held her hand, repeatedly tried to kiss
her, grabbed her face, kissed her, rubbed her own buttocks, and told the plaintiff
"kiss it," "you love it, honey" and "I want you, honey" because the behavior did not
occur because of sex as a matter of law).
421. In his dissent in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1070-78
(9th Cir. 2002), Judge Proctor Hug attempts to distinguish Nichols v. Sanchez,
256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). While Nichols was allegedly heterosexual and Rene
homosexual, Judge Hug does not overtly base his distinction on this difference.
Rene, 305 F.3d at 1077. Instead, he argues that Nichols was discriminated
against based on his effeminate behavior at work, whereas Rene was discrimi-
nated against based on his sexual orientation. See id. This distinction is amor-
phous, unless courts want openly to distinguish between heterosexuals and homo-
sexuals. It would deny rights to a whole class of persons-homosexuals-and it
would lead to intrusions into the privacy of individuals. Finally, some courts have
already concluded that a harassing environment based on "perceived homosexual-
ity" is permissible. See, e.g., Vickers, 453 F.3d at 763; Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1058.
Thus, in these cases, heterosexuals would also suffer harassment without re-
course. In Hamm, Judge Posner assumes that the sex stereotyping doctrine ap-
plies only to heterosexual men and that homosexual men cannot use this doctrine
to create a cause of action. 332 F.3d at 1067 (Posner, J., concurring). When Pos-
ner makes this argument, he implicitly recognizes the impossibility of separating
harassment based on sexual orientation and harassment based on a person's fail-
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impossible for courts, juries, or even victims or perpetrators to
distinguish between behavior that is motivated by the victim's
failure to conform to gender stereotypes and behavior moti-
vated by the victim's sexual orientation.
Yet courts' analyses demonstrate a stark misunderstand-
ing that draws on stereotypes of men and boys, uninformed by
social science research. In an attempt to follow Oncale, many
courts conclude as a matter of law that this behavior did not
occur because of sex either because it occurred because of sex-
ual orientation or perceived sexual orientation,422 or because
the harassers engaged in normal horseplay.423 In concluding
that the behavior occurred because of sexual orientation, courts
point to the specific language used to harass, much of which,
admittedly, references sexual orientation.424 But, without the
help of social science literature, courts are blind to the fact that
the motivation and purpose for engaging in this harassment is
to denigrate the masculinity of the victim, to compare the vic-
tim to women, and to enhance the masculinity of the harassers
in the eyes of their male colleagues.
As masculinities theory demonstrates, masculinity and
heterosexuality are inseparable in the minds of the men engag-
ing in this behavior.425 Robert Connell notes that hegemonic
masculinity subordinates gay men and gay masculinity, con-
flating it with femininity. He states:
Gayness, in patriarchal ideology, is the repository of what-
ever is symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculin-
ity.... Hence, from the point of view of hegemonic mascu-
linity, gayness is easily assimilated to femininity. And
ure to conform to stereotypes. However, he excludes from the doctrine homosexu-
als who would otherwise be protected by the statute. This exclusion would create
an incentive to prove that an employee is homosexual or that he was perceived to
be homosexual, a prospect that may lead to perjury, discovery abuse and further
harassment. Other courts reaching this question are in clear disagreement. Ac-
cording to these courts, the sexual orientation of the plaintiff is irrelevant in de-
ciding whether the discrimination is because of sex. See Rene, 305 F.3d at 1068
(Fletcher, J., for four members of the court); Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265.
422. See supra note 419 and infra note 424 and accompanying text.
423. See, e.g., Linville v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.
2003) (affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment because, although
the plaintiff was "backhanded in the scrotum" repeatedly by a coworker, the be-
havior did not occur because of sex).
424. See Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1085 (7th Cir. 2000) (con-
cluding behavior occurred because of perceived homosexuality); Bibby, 260 F.3d at
261-64.
425. R.W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES 78 (1995).
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hence, in the view of some gay theorists, the ferocity of ho-
mophobic attacks.4 26
Concepts of masculinity and sexual orientation are inextri-
cably intertwined. Connell notes that in this society "hege-
monic masculinity is defined exclusively as heterosexual.' '427
Even the most aggressive, competitive, and masculine gay men
are considered not masculine, merely because of the identity of
their sex partners. 4 28
Moreover, masculinities research shows that men in pre-
dominantly male work environments often denigrate women
and other males who do not conform to gender norms, by using
gender specific language that equates inferiority with being
female or feminine.429 The greatest insults lodged against
other men, whether heterosexual or homosexual, challenge
their masculinity. 430 These insults include references to the
victim's gender; they refer to him in terms used to refer to
women, such as "bitch," or that give him characteristics of
women, such as "pussy" or "milquetoast," or that conflate a lack
of masculinity with homosexuality. 431 This behavior, which
Robert Connell identifies as a "symbolic blurring with feminin-
ity,"432 maintains the superiority of the masculine over the
426. Id.
427. Id. at 143, 162.
428. Id.
429. See, e.g., Sharon R. Bird, Welcome to the Men's Club: Homosociality and
the Maintenance of Hegemonic Masculinity, 10 GENDER & SOCY 120, 122, 125-129
(1996) (concluding from her study of heterosexual males that homosociality, the
attraction of men in non-sexual ways to one another, is used to reinforce meanings
of hegemonic masculinity and differentiation from that which is feminine; when
heterosexual men associated with each other they constantly reinforced the
hegemonic masculine behaviors of emotional detachment, competition, and sexual
objectification of women and encouraged suppression of "feminine" characteristics
such as expressing one's feelings); Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challeng-
ing Masculinity in Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
68, 68-69 (2002) (describing the hostile treatment of Shannon Faulkner, the first
woman to integrate The Citadel, a military college in South Carolina; the male
students screamed obscenities at Shannon, addressed death threats to her,
scrawled on the bathroom wall "Let her in, then fuck her to death"). This behav-
ior begins early-boys attack other boys as being "girls" or "sissies" on the play-
ground in elementary school. See BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND
BOYS IN SCHOOL 115-118 (1999) (noting the prevalent use of "sissy" as a deroga-
tory term to refer to boys who like to do "girl things," as opposed to the use of
"tomboy" to refer relatively positively to girls who are athletic or like comfortable
clothing).
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feminine, of men over women. Gender scholars attribute this
behavior to attempts to preserve the job in question as mascu-
line and the exclusive domain of men.433 In blue-collar jobs,
these practices-which are often violent in nature-reinforce
the masculine identities of the job holders, protect their fragile
place in the hierarchy, and permit them to challenge the "limp
wristed" paper-pusher managers whose jobs are less mascu-
line.434
If permitted by law, the conflation of certain types of work
with men, and men with hegemonic masculinity, privileges
gender-conforming men over women and gender non-
conforming men. It leads to environments that are abusive to
women and gender non-conforming men because of their sex,
and it creates a class of jobs that excludes all but the most dar-
ing women and gender non-conforming men. Courts that do
not recognize that this behavior discriminates because of sex,
in violation of Title VII, reinforce the hegemonic masculinity,
the superiority of masculine men and the inferiority of women,
and the gender differences in pay and experience.
Even if courts conclude that it is impossible to distinguish
behavior that is directed at a man because of his homosexuality
from behavior occurring because he is effeminate, Title VII
provides other avenues to conclude that the employer has dis-
criminated because of sex. First, like the cases where courts
consider the effects of the behavior on women in concluding
433. See WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 77-79; James E. Gruber, The Impact of
Male Work Environments and Organizational Policies on Women's Experiences of
Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & SOC'Y 301, 314 (1998) (finding that predomi-
nantly male environments are more physically hostile and threatening to women,
and men are more likely to mark their work environments with symbols of the
sexual objectification of women); Patricia Yancey Martin, Gender, Interaction, and
Inequality in Organizations, in GENDER, INTERACTION AND INEQUALITY 217 (Ce-
cilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1991) (men attempt to exclude women peers because they
fear that women's presence will undermine the masculinity requirements of the
job leading to lower status and pay); Schultz, supra note 4, at 1687; cf. Angela P.
Harris, Gender, Violence, Race and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 793-
96 (2000) ("hypermasculinity," including aggression and violence in police work, is
a means of maintaining masculine identity of the job and the men in the job). So-
ciologist Barrie Thorne has found that boys who are good athletes, popular and
masculine can more easily "cross over" to play with the girls in elementary school
without harming their reputations. THORNE, supra note 429, at 122-23.
434. See Collinson, supra note 236, at 185-86 (noting that on shop floors work-
ers see their positions as signifying masculinity in contrast to management who
they saw as feminine); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 78 (stating that the
hidden injuries of class experienced by male blue-collar workers create the incen-
tive to define their own work as truly masculine).
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that the behavior occurs because of sex,4 35 courts should con-
sider the effects of the behavior on men who are gendered
"feminine." Hyper-masculine behaviors will likely have a more
discriminatory effect on men who are gendered "feminine" than
on those who are gendered "masculine."
A second avenue for concluding that this behavior occurs
because of sex would characterize the case as a mixed motives
case: the behavior occurs because the target is homosexual and
because he is effeminate. In a mixed motives case under Title
VII, defendants are liable to plaintiffs who prove that sex or
gender is a motivating factor for the adverse employment ac-
tion even though other legitimate factors also motivated the
decision. 436 Once the plaintiff proves that the illegitimate fac-
tor motivated the decision, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove that it would have taken the same action even in the ab-
sence of the impermissible factor. If the defendant makes this
proof, it can limit the plaintiffs remedies. 437
Because discrimination based on sexual orientation is not
illegal under Title VII,438 sexual orientation would be the "le-
gitimate" motive in these cases and gender nonconformity
would be the "illegitimate" motive. Once it is established that
an illegitimate reason motivated the defendant's action, the
employee prevails. The defendant will then have the opportu-
435. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
436. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment prac-
tice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the prac-
tice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) states:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section
703(m) and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as
provided in clause (ii), and attorney's fees and costs dem-
onstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a
claim under section 703 (m); and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment,
described in subparagraph (A).
See also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (concluding that di-
rect evidence of discrimination is not necessary in a mixed motives case).
437. See id.
438. For an explanation of why Title VII should be interpreted to ban sexual
orientation discrimination, see McGinley, supra note 29, at 410-17.
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nity to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have acted the same way even in absence of the illegiti-
mate factor. This burden would be difficult to meet, but if the
defendant meets its burden of proof, it may limit the plaintiffs
remedies. 439
Masculinities research and queer theory explain the blur-
ring of sex and gender and of gender and sexual orientation.
Because biological sex is conflated with gender, women are ex-
pected to be feminine, receptive, and passive, and to possess a
sexual orientation toward persons who are male or mascu-
line.440 Men should be aggressive and possess a sexual orienta-
tion toward the passive or feminine. 441 If a man is masculine,
according to this syllogism, he will be oriented toward women
sexually.442 Thus, men who are oriented toward men are con-
sidered feminine. 443 Frank Valdes convincingly demonstrates
that the hatred homosexual men experience is related more to
their presumed lack of masculinity than to the identity of their
sexual partners.44 4 In one example, volunteer enlisted men in-
vestigated the homosexual activities of servicemen at the New-
port Naval Training Center. Even though the volunteers en-
gaged in sexual acts with their male subjects, they considered
themselves masculine because they were aggressive, rather
than passive or receptive, during the sexual activities. 445
Masculinities theory demonstrates that homophobia is in-
extricably linked to men's sense of masculinity because mascu-
linity is defined by that which is not feminine; masculine be-
ings are aggressive whereas feminine beings are passive. The
sex act between men and women is symbolic of this difference.
Masculine men ("real men") are aggressive, and feminine
women are passive and accepting of the man's behavior. Even
the most masculine men whose orientation is homosexual are
considered effeminate and nonconforming with the norms of
hegemonic masculinity. 446 Thus, men who harass other men
439. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
440. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstruct-
ing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American




444. See id. at 72-74, 95-99.
445. Id. at 72-74.
446. See CONNELL, supra note 31, at 143, 162; McGinley, supra note 29, at
408-09.
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conflate femininity and homosexuality in their harassing be-
haviors. Men who are harassed for failure to conform to ac-
cepted notions of masculine behavior and dress are, therefore,
discriminated against because of their gender, whether they
are heterosexual or homosexual in their orientation.447
3. Men Harassing Men-Hazing, Horseplay, and
Incivility
Another type of harassment of men at work may involve
hazing or horseplay. As this Article uses the terms, hazing oc-
curs at the beginning of the working relationship or when an
individual transfers to work with a new group, whereas horse-
play may occur throughout the employment relationship.
While the behaviors that constitute hazing or horseplay may be
indistinguishable from behavior creating a hostile work envi-
ronment, courts have drawn a line between horseplay/hazing
and actionable harassing behavior.448
For example, in Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc.,449 the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a sexual harassment
case brought by a male plaintiff who suffered from four serious
incidents at the hands of a coworker. The offender, Dill,
weighed 100 pounds more than the plaintiff and remarked that
the plaintiff had a "cheerleader's ass" and that it 'would look
real nice on my dick.' ' 450 He then forced Shafer's face to Dill's
crotch, moving his groin to give the impression that Shafer was
performing fellatio.451 Later, Dill grabbed Shafer's hand and
moved it to Dill's crotch while moving as if he were masturbat-
ing.452 This incident was performed with so much force that
Shafer was afraid Dill would break his arm. When in the
locker room and Shafer had no shirt on, Dill pulled out a hand-
ful of Shafer's chest hair, causing him considerable pain. Fi-
nally, Dill bit Shafer hard in the neck, raising welts. 453 The
court assumed that Dill behaved this way in order to demon-
strate "physical domination. '454 Nonetheless, the court stated
447. Frank Valdes demonstrates this by way of powerful examples. See Valdes,
supra note 440, at 38-44, 51, 72-74, 95-99.
448. See, e.g., Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2005).
449. Id.




454. Id. at 665-66.
20081 1227
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1227 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
that sexual horseplay differs from sex discrimination, and con-
cluded that the behavior was not sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to constitute sexual harassment.455
The Seventh Circuit relied on Oncale, where the Court
noted that Title VII does not regulate "horseplay," but requires
behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
terms or conditions of employment. 456 Implicit in this view is
that horseplay is harmless and insufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter and terms or conditions of employment, and, per-
haps, not gender-based.
Kal Kan and Collinson's shop study both suggest a con-
trary conclusion. In Collinson's study, the harassing behavior
that is intended to inculcate the newcomer into the shop norms
is related to sex. First, as is obvious by much of the behavior,
its methodology involves sexual assault, sexual threats, and
sexual comments. Federal courts conclude that sexual meth-
odology alone is insufficient to find that the behavior occurred
because of sex.457 But the fact that there is sexualized behavior
should not be irrelevant. The use of sexualized behavior is
common in hazing and horseplay, and it is used to accomplish
the goal of masculinizing the group. 458 Hazing occurs because
of sex when its purpose is to establish the masculine creden-
tials of the group and to assure that the newcomer adheres to
these masculine norms.459 Hazing uses exaggerated sexual or
gender-based behavior to humiliate the newest member, who
the hazer compares to women in a demeaning way. 460 The
hazed are assaulted and are often required to humiliate them-
selves. 461 Through hazing, the perpetrators demonstrate their
masculinity and require the newcomers to show their subservi-
ence to group norms.46 2 Sanday's account of fraternity gang
rape demonstrates that unity is accomplished through aggres-
sive masculinities, which emphasize that women are sexual ob-
jects and that real men are in charge. 463 This emphasis occurs
by imposing behavior and comments on the newcomers, com-
455. Id. at 666.
456. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998)).
457. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
458. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
459. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
460. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
461. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
462. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
463. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
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paring them to dirty women and exhorting them to drive out
the feminine in themselves. 464
This behavior occurs to induct the new male employee into
the perpetrators' society or to assure that society members are
still under the control of the group. 465 It is gendered because
the purpose of the offending behavior is to establish male
domination in the group.
Masculinities theory supports Schultz's conclusions that
jobs are gendered and that men in traditionally male jobs har-
ass women and non-conforming men in order to maintain the
masculinity of the job.466 Masculinities theory, however, goes
beyond Schultz's competence paradigm to explain that men in
jobs harass or haze other men, even those who are gender-
conforming, in order to establish the job as a man's job and to
assure unity among men. Perhaps even more important, mas-
culinities theory explains that men behave this way because
their masculinity is subordinated to other more powerful ver-
sions of masculinity.467 This insight is important in under-
standing why hazing and horseplay occur because of sex. By
accomplishing this conformity in traditional male workplaces
or jobs, men, who may already be threatened by a more power-
ful form of masculinity, not only reinforce masculine norms,
but also indirectly screen out women from men's jobs.
As Franke noted, the behavior occurs to reinforce hetero-
patriarchal norms; however, it is important to recognize that
reinforcing these norms in the workplace will, consciously or
not, eliminate women's opportunities to perform the job.468
Like a secret male society, these groups of men continuously
464. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
465. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
466. See supra Part I.A.
467. There are multiple forms of masculinity. Stephen Whitehead divides
them into hegemonic, subordinated and conservative. See Stephen Whitehead,
Disrupted Selves: Resistence and Identity Work in the Managerial Arena, 10
GENDER & EDUC. 199, 203 (1998).
468. The argument presented here is similar to that of Professor Abrams' criti-
cism of Franke's work. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 1193-94. While I agree
with much of Franke's position that the purpose of the harassment is to reinforce
hetero-patriarchal norms, I also agree with Abrams that Franke seems not to fo-
cus sufficiently on the importance of the workplace as a site of resistance and
power for women. Franke is correct, however, that we should not ignore the har-
assment that occurs in schools because, in my view, school-based harassment
teaches us a great deal about how groups of boys (and later, men) behave when
engaging in homosocial competition. See Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex,
Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Abrams, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1245, 1247-49 (1998).
2008] 1229
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1229 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
police both the gender of their members and the job itself.
Katherine Franke expressed discomfort with the male-on-male
horseplay as a category that creates a potential cause of action
under Title VII. 469 She noted that this relationship should re-
quire a higher proof standard of harm in order to prove that
the man bringing the action has standing to sue.470 I disagree.
Masculinities theory explains that the men who perform mas-
culine practices are often subliminated to other men. As in the
example of Collinson's shop, men do not belong to a monolithic
group that enjoys the rough behavior. In fact, many men find
it difficult, painful and stress-inducing.471 So long as those
men are able to prove, as is required by the statute, that the
behavior is unwelcome, severe, or pervasive and that they have
suffered injury as a result, they should have a cause of ac-
tion.472
The law should support men who are willing to resist the
shop horseplay because the horseplay harms not only gender-
conforming men, but also gender-nonconforming men and
women.473 Ultimately, the introduction of substantial numbers
of women to desegregate these male jobs is necessary in order
to ensure equality for men and women; desegregation will only
occur once we have eliminated the roughest behavior that still
takes place in order to establish the shop as a men's club.
4. Men Harassing Women Using Gender-Neutral
Behavior or Language
Sexual and gendered harassment present a variety of fact
patterns. When men harass women, ordinarily their behavior
combines sexualized and gendered behavior. Sometimes, the
469. See Franke, supra note 21, at 768-69.
470. See id.
471. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
472. A failure to recognize this as discrimination would also fail to acknowl-
edge that these men are required to perform their gender identity in a way that is
uncomfortable to them in order to comfort those around them. Cf. Carbado & Gu-
lati, supra note 252, at 1288-89; Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth
Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 717-28 (2001) (arguing that if
outsiders are discriminated against for failing to perform their identity in order to
comfort those at the workplace, they may have a cause of action under Title VII);
Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Inter-
group Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 80-82 (2002) (arguing that men who are insiders
and who refuse to discriminate against outsider groups should have a cause of ac-
tion under Title VII beyond an associational right).
473. Cf. Zatz, supra note 472, at 74-78.
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behavior is only sexualized or only gendered. A less obvious
fact pattern occurs when harassment occurs because of sex (or
gender), but content is sex-neutral and gender-neutral. This
final fact pattern is rarely litigated. These cases are particu-
larly difficult to prove because the men involved may use and
abuse legitimate work standards to criticize women.
One example of this gender-neutral sexual harassment
was observed by sociologist Anastasia Prokos in a police train-
ing academy. 474 Both men and women were exposed to similar
behavior, but Prokos concluded that although the training was
explicitly gender neutral, very strong implicit messages were
sent to women that they were inferior.475 This was accom-
plished by treating the women students as outsiders, exagger-
ating the differences between men and women, using visual
images in training movies that sexually objectified women, re-
sisting authority of powerful women by treating women in-
structors with less respect, ignoring the training on domestic
violence, and verbally denigrating women students.476 Male
instructors and students used the women's presence to "further
the project of masculinity construction."477
Gender-neutral behavior may occur more commonly in
white-collar jobs where the harassers are more sophisticated
and attempt to hide their purpose in harassing their female
subordinates, superiors, or colleagues. Cortina explained that
women lawyers suffered from differential treatment in the
court system.478 The women stated that they were excluded
from conversations between male lawyers.479 They also noted
that male lawyers and judges questioned or undermined the
women's professional competence, engaged in gender dispar-
agement, made comments on women's appearance, and mistook
them for non-lawyers. 480 Eight percent of the women stated
that they had received unwanted sexual attention from male
lawyers or judges. 481 In interviews, the women explained that
although much of the behavior is not explicitly anti-female,
they believe it occurs because of gender. 482 Ironically, other
474. See Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, supra note 399.
475. Id. at 446.
476. See id. at 446-54.
477. Id. at 454.
478. See Cortina et al., supra note 163, at 246-47.
479. Id. at 247.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 254.
482. Id. at 253.
2008] 1231
HeinOnline -- 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1231 2008
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
women insisted that the behavior does not occur because of
gender. 483 Cortina concluded that in either event, women suf-
fer something men do not. They are constantly trying to figure
out whether gender is affecting the behavior of others toward
them, a task which imposes a cognitive burden on women. 484
Masculinities theory can provide the theoretical support
for new bullying research regarding gender-neutral bullying of
women workers. Researchers who study bullying recently have
found that women are subjected to more gender-neutral bully-
ing than men and that male supervisors manipulate systems
designed to protect workers from abuse in order to bully or
harass women. 485 Moreover, research demonstrates that, un-
like men who suffer less bullying as they move higher in the
organization, women who rise in the ranks of the organization
are bullied at a greater rate.4 86 While organizational power is
used to bully the first set of women, it cannot protect women
who are in higher positions from bullying by subordinates, co-
workers, and superiors. But theorists believe that while male
subordinates lack organizational power, they have power de-
rived from the superior position of men in society.487 Because
they have more power derived from their gender, male subor-
dinates at times use that gender power to harass women who
are their superiors. Gender is a key factor in the analysis.
III. A PROPOSAL: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS
This Article uses masculinities theory and bullying re-
search to demonstrate the location of gender within organiza-
tional contexts. It notes that gender is deeply embedded in or-
ganizations to the point that it is almost impossible for
organizations to detect. This Part argues that there are very
important reasons, nonetheless, to support a project that
eliminates the harmful gender constructs within organizations.
Subpart A juxtaposes two case studies on organizational behav-
ior. The first is the loss of the Challenger shuttle, which the
authors attribute, at least in part, to the presence of masculin-
ities in the workplace. The second is the study of an oil rig that
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. See supra Part I.B.2.
486. See supra Part I.B.2.
487. See Juliano, supra note 154, at 505-06.
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all but eliminated competitive and destructive masculine prac-
tices. After the case studies, Subpart B discusses the reasons
for eliminating competitive masculinities from workplaces.
These reasons include harm to women, harm to men, and harm
to organizations and society.
A. Two Case Studies: Organizational
Encouragement/Discouragement of Masculinities
1. The Challenger Disaster: The Role of Masculinities
Even within an organization that employs primarily white,
middle-class workers, there are competing masculinities, some
of which are subordinated to others. Sociologists Mark Maier
and James Messerschmidt studied the competing masculinities
in the decision to launch the ill-fated space shuttle, the Chal-
lenger,488 which tragically exploded only seventy-three seconds
into flight. 48 9 A Presidential Commission found that the disas-
ter was caused by the failure, due to freezing temperatures, of
a rubber 0-ring in the Solid Rocket Booster.490 The Commis-
sion also concluded that there were serious flaws in the deci-
sion-making process that led to the launch of the spacecraft de-
spite the fact that engineers had warned of potential
dangers. 49 1 While not discounting the role of factors such as
technological failures, managerial hubris, or conflicting organ-
izational cultures, Maier and Messerschmidt observe that gen-
der played a key role in the shuttle disaster.492
NASA proceeded with the shuttle program in the mid-
1970s with the idea that it would fly approximately sixty mis-
sions a year.493 The most it ever flew were nine missions in
1985. In 1986, the year of the Challenger launch, NASA offi-
cials hoped to fly fifteen missions. There were concerns about
the rocket boosters proposed by contractor Morton Thiokol as
early as 1977 when NASA engineers first warned about the de-
ficiencies of the design. Nonetheless, Morton Thiokol won the
contract to produce the rocket boosters. When the shuttle be-
gan flying in 1981, the concerns were confirmed when hot gases
488. Maier & Messerschmidt, supra note 37.
489. Id. at 325.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 325, 328-329.
492. Id. at 326.
493. Id. at 327-30 (describing the facts leading up to the Challenger disaster
that are incorporated in the following two paragraphs).
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inside the rockets began to erode the twin rubber O-ring seals.
In spite of increasing erosion, the flights continued. In 1985,
there were two near-disasters: one in cold weather in which hot
gases burned through the primary O-ring, and a second when a
primary seal in a nozzle failed, allowing the secondary O-ring
to be partially corroded. A Thiokol rocket engineer wrote a
blistering memo to the Vice President of Engineering at
Thiokol warning about the possibility of loss of human life.
These near-disasters led to the establishment of a task force at
Morton Thiokol. Unfortunately, the task force did not accom-
plish its purpose. When a meeting occurred between Thiokol
and NASA personnel, the NASA Director insisted that Thiokol
alter its presentation to downplay the importance of the failure
of the O-rings. While Thiokol downplayed the problem, it
stressed that the lack of a secondary joint seal was crucial.
NASA decided to continue to fly the shuttle "as is."
One week before the Challenger launch, NASA announced
that it was seeking bids from four competitors to supply addi-
tional rocket boosters for the shuttle. Thiokol's exclusive con-
trol was threatened. The evening before the launch, which had
been postponed three times due to cold weather, Thiokol engi-
neers recommended against the launch. The NASA program
manager attacked the Thiokol position aggressively, pressing
for quantitative proof that it was unsafe to launch. Thiokol
then took a break. Managers at Thiokol told the engineers that
it was a management decision. The engineers were visibly up-
set and urged their supervisors to stand by the original deci-
sion. The Senior Vice President disciplined at least two of the
engineers by giving them unfriendly looks. The senior manag-
ers did not listen to the engineers and, finally, decided to
change their recommendation. NASA accepted the recommen-
dation as a "green light."
Meir and Messerschmidt explain that the decision to
launch illustrates commonalities among men as well as a num-
ber of masculinities in competition with one another: career-
ism, entrepreneurialism, and authoritarianism. The authors
observe that the managers and engineers at both NASA and
Morton Thiokol shared the masculine concept of career, defined
by masculinities theorists as an "acute preoccupation with pro-
fessional ambitions and progress so that men engage in specific
practices-such as working long hours-that negate the possi-
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bility of other practices-such as domestic responsibilities. '" 494
NASA managers worked excessively and the Presidential
Commission that reported on the failure of the Challenger at-
tributed the decision to launch, in part, to managers' lack of
sleep.495
Moreover, the Morton Thiokol managers' definitions of
masculinity clashed with those of their engineers. The manag-
ers' masculinity centered on achieving entrepreneurial organ-
izational goals (keeping their contract for the shuttle boosters)
while the engineers' masculinities revolved around acquiring
and proving their technical competence. 496 Morton Thiokol
managers engaged in entrepreneurial risk taking in order to
achieve their economic goal of keeping the contract with NASA,
while NASA managers took entrepreneurial risks because they
wanted to prove that they could fly more missions in 1986 than
NASA had flown before. The meeting on the evening before the
launch between Thiokol engineers and senior managers dem-
onstrates "how the definition of masculinity is not only the col-
lective work of a group of people-in this case corporate man-
agers and engineers-but that it is constructed differently
through social interaction."497 The meeting of the Thiokol en-
gineers and managers demonstrated conflicting masculine val-
ues held by the two groups. The managers, who were vested
with the decision whether to recommend the launch, used their
power, and the engineers succumbed to the authoritarian mas-
culinity of the managers. 498 In turn, the NASA managers used
their authority to pressure the Morton Thiokol managers into a
reversal of their original recommendation. 499 As the Morton
Thiokol managers engaged in dominant masculinities in their
treatment of their engineers, they also engaged in a subordi-
nate masculinity in their willingness to allow the NASA man-
agers to dominate them. 500
The authors conclude that masculinities are varied and
complex and that they play out in social situations. Moreover,
they state, "[g]ender ... is powerfully present among a group of
'men only,' not just salient when women and men share the
494. Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 332.
497. Id. at 336.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 337.
500. Id. at 338.
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same space."50 1 While it is unlikely that these masculine be-
haviors violated Title VII in this case study, the study demon-
strates that the presence of masculinities may have been at
least partially responsible for the disastrous failure of the shut-
tle. Organizational structures that curb the practice of mascu-
linities would likely further the goals of the organization.
2. The Oil-Rig: Attempting to Create a Safer
Workplace
A recent study suggests that is not impossible for employ-
ers to eliminate harmful masculinities from workplaces. Un-
derstanding the invisible gendered nature of the workplace and
enforcing the law to eradicate the practices that harm women
and many men at work could potential transform the American
workplace. While some economists argue that the American
workplace necessarily engages masculine, aggressive, competi-
tive, and hard-driving tactics in order to compete in a global
market, new research suggests the opposite. It may be that
eliminating the most destructive masculinities at work will
have a positive effect not only on work relationships but also on
productivity and efficiency.
Organizational experts, Robin Ely and Debra Meyerson,
performed an ethnographic study of two offshore oil plat-
forms. 50 2 Work on oil rigs, like other dangerous work per-
formed predominantly by all-male workforces, historically pre-
sents an important site for expression of masculinity and the
enhancing of masculine credentials. 50 3 Men reaffirm their
masculinity in these workplaces by appearing physically tough,
technically infallible, and emotionally detached. 50 4
On the rigs studied by Ely and Meyerson, management
was concerned with safety issues and adopted a new policy:
Safety 2000.505 This initiative caused workers to construct
their individual and group identities around the workplace
norm of safety.50 6 As a result, there was a decline in the acci-
dent rate by eighty-four percent while the company's produc-
tion (number of barrels of oil), efficiency (cost per barrel), and
501. Id. at 342.
502. See generally Ely & Meyerson, supra note 28.
503. Id. at 9.
504. See id. at 9-12.
505. Id. at 13.
506. Id. at 2.
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reliability (production time) exceeded the industry's previous
benchmark. 507
Workers explained that the atmosphere on the oil rigs had
changed due to the safety initiative. Gone were the fights, the
displays of masculinity, the horseplay, the physical practical
jokes, and the macho treatment of others. The authors ob-
served that workers developed close interpersonal relation-
ships; openly admitted their mistakes, their shortcomings, and
their fears; and showed sensitivity toward others. The authors
concluded that there was a "transformation in how men experi-
enced themselves and their relationships with one another. This
transformation-spurred by organizational practices and
norms stemming from the safety initiative-released men from
the performance of masculinity traditionally associated with
dangerous work. '508
The authors further concluded that the primary difference
between the men working on the oil rigs during the safety ini-
tiative and those who worked on oil rigs before the initiative
began was that the men who acted aggressively toward one an-
other during earlier studies were primarily motivated by a
need to prove their masculinity. 50 9 In contrast, the men in this
study were motivated primarily by collective goals-the safety
and well being of coworkers and the accomplishment of the
work. 510 Ely and Meyerson looked to social psychology to ex-
plain this result. They noted that research on the self suggests
that the goals of self-validation and other-orientation elicit dif-
ferent behavior. When self-validating, the enhancement of the
self is the goal. When other-orientated, people see the self as
an agent but not as the goal itself. These different goal orien-
tations, posit Ely and Meyerson, result in different relational
processes. 511
Earlier platform workers engaged in stereotypically mas-
culine displays of physical strength, technical infallibility, and
emotional detachment. 512 The men Ely and Meyerson ob-
served, in contrast, did not. Instead, they enhanced safety by
conceding personal limitations and publicly revealing their
mistakes and shortcomings.513 They openly shared their fears
507. Id. at 13.
508. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
509. Id. at 17-19.
510. Id. at 19.
511. See id. at 19-20.
512. Id. at 20.
513. Id. at 20-26.
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and acknowledged their vulnerabilities. 514 This behavior "had
a profound effect on their sense of who they were and could be
as men. '"515 The men did not abandon identity construction but
became engaged "in a different process of masculine identity-
construction. '" 516 Their process was generative rather than de-
fensive in that it was designed to enhance the safety of the
group and the group's production goals. 517 As a result, the men
developed deeper, more intimate relationships with one an-
other. They discussed their fears and their families without
shame. They were open and not condemning toward one an-
other.518 For example, men openly admitted that they had
adopted more feminine traits such as compassion. 519
They did not, however, repudiate their masculine traits.
While continuing to exercise physical strength and demon-
strate technical expertise, they did not have to prove them-
selves to one another.520
Ely and Meyerson suggest that organizations can play a
role in disrupting the cultural norms of aggressive masculinity.
Three organizational conditions must precede this disruption: a
connective purpose, psychological safety, and the decoupling of
masculinity and competence. 521 While men will continue to
construct gender identities, they do not feel a need to prove
those identities. 522
Ely and Meyerson raised the question of whether mascu-
line traits themselves are destructive, or whether the need to
prove masculinity is the real problem.523 If it is the need to
prove one's masculinity that is destructive, many of the mascu-
line characteristics that society finds laudatory and from which
the society benefits-such as leadership and heroism-need not
be compromised by an attempt to reward connective purpose
and behavior. It would be the drive to prove these masculine
traits that should be curbed. Besides the drive to prove mascu-
linity, harm also results where positive "masculine" traits are
conflated with the male body: the concept that all men should
514. Id. at 20.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 25.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 26.
520. Id. at 27.
521. Id. at 28-35.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 40.
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possess these traits, and if they do not, they are not "real men,"
and the conclusion that women do not or should not possess
these traits.
This case study is important because it suggests that or-
ganizations can create structures and policies that eliminate
the most damaging masculinities in the workplace without
condemning those masculine traits that further individual, or-
ganizational, and societal good.
B. Eliminating Destructive Gender Constructs at Work
In order to ensure a just workplace, it is necessary to
eliminate the destructive gender constructs at work. The rea-
sons for this project are threefold. First, gender constructs
harm women. Because of the presence of a gender construct
that uniformly brands women as inferior, women continue to
suffer adverse economic and emotional consequences relative to
their male counterparts. If the purpose of prohibiting sex dis-
crimination under Title VII is to eliminate gender or sex as a
reason for making employment decisions and as a basis for al-
tering the terms and conditions of a person's employment, Title
VII is far from reaching its goal. A neutral playing field cannot
exist until gender becomes more visible, is acknowledged, and,
to some extent, is vanquished from the workplace.
Second, gender constructs harm men. While men as a
whole benefit from masculinities, the aggressive competition
created by the need to prove masculinity places pressure on all
men, particularly on those men who cannot live up to the
hegemonic masculinity-which is most men. Even if all men
could live up to the hegemonic definition of masculinity, some
men would prefer not to engage in the competition or the de-
structive behavior.
Third, gender constructs at work harm the organization.
Maier and Mayerschmidt's account of the Challenger launch524
and Ely and Meyerson's description of the men working on oil
rigs 525 demonstrate, in contrasting ways, that competing mas-
culinities may lead to less favorable results and that cooperat-
ing may enhance men's relationships with one another as well
as productivity and efficiency in the workplace.
524. See Maier & Messerschmidt, supra note 37.
525. See supra notes 502-23 and accompanying text.
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A close study of masculinities theory, bullying, hazing, and
harassment demonstrates that many behaviors courts consider
normal or not occurring because of sex actually take place,
whether consciously or unconsciously, to establish the job or
workplace as an all-male enclave or to reinforce the masculine
credentials of the job and the masculinity of the job holders.
Even absent an intent to marginalize women and certain men,
many of these behaviors have a disparate effect on most women
and on men who do not conform to gendered expectations. The
research examined in Part I, therefore, supports the view that
the four scenarios studied here all occur in a gendered envi-
ronment and should be recognized by Title VII as taking place
because of sex.
Courts should recognize that severe or pervasive misogy-
nist behavior in a previously all-male workplace creates a hos-
tile work environment for women entering the workplace be-
cause of their sex, even if the behavior is not specifically
directed at women. They should also conclude that group be-
havior that harasses individual men who fail to conform to
masculine norms occurs "because of sex." Furthermore, this
article demonstrates that hazing and horseplay, when they are
sufficiently severe or pervasive, can occur because of sex and
should be prohibited when they do. Finally, gender- and sex-
neutral harassing behavior directed at men or women because
of their sex should be illegal if it is sufficiently severe or perva-
sive to alter the terms or conditions of employment.
The purpose of Title VII is to guarantee equal employment
opportunity to all persons regardless of their sex, gender, race,
color, national origin, or religion. 526 Permitting severe or per-
vasive harassing behavior that is intentionally gendered or
that disparately affects women and/or men who are not suffi-
ciently masculine contravenes the purpose of the statute and
prevents Title VII from fulfilling its promise of equality at
work.
CONCLUSION
Workplaces are sites of construction of male gender iden-
tity. While there may be nothing wrong with constructing gen-
der identity at work, masculinities research and the new bully-
ing research demonstrate that men's proving masculinity in
526. See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
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the workplace can be destructive to many men and to women.
Title VII's hostile work environment law provides a vehicle
that, when interpreted properly, permits courts to conclude
that severe or repetitive harassment or bullying behavior, es-
pecially when it is performed by groups in sex segregated
workplaces, discriminates against the target because of sex.
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